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CHAPTER I 
IKTaOJUCTION 
The amy has always played an important part In the open­
ing; of new territories in Aoeriean History. It is the one to 
open up these new areas, to explore and to mtp then and then 
to make thera safe for occupation* In what is now the state 
of ĵ ntana this iras entirely true. From the very iMigiiislng 
of Montana history, there is a record of the ari|sr*s activity. 
Juewis â  Clark opened Montana for the am̂ r »»hen they crossed 
the area in ld05, and in the following years nan;̂  expeditions 
wer9 sent out to investigate vaA nap the .territory * 
The amy did not plan out any strategy to facilitate the 
settlement of Montana and the surrounding: territory un$il 
about 1860, for there was no iMcessity of doln̂  so. During 
the period iooediately proceeding the Cî vll War, the idea 
of setting aside the west for the use of the Indian forever, 
disî peared. Settlers, trappers, and niners had ên novlng 
into the west to the ̂ âclfic Coast since 1̂ 0 and had dis--
covered its potentiaj-ttles. ''oAd discovered, first in 
Cvxifomi then in Colorado, and around 1B60 in the Morth-
mijiV* Stp̂ ŝ of eoigrantB floitsd into the country and 
trouble arose with the Indians %dio resentad the intrusion 
of the whites on iVeir lands. ,|t uss unvicr the ispetuS of 
Indian «iasia(bres and uprisings %ibiai the aip̂  look the matter 
into haiKl and tried to work out soaie sort of a plan to settle 
the Indian proole.n forevor. 
At first the plan seemed to be to strike with ail the 
force the amy coaxd aaister against the hostiles in the hope 
that in one asighty uattie the Indians could t>e forced to oow 
to the will of the »shite Father# In 1863, 1864, and in 1̂ 165, 
the aray tried out this policy out failed to put an end to 
the trouble with the iad aan® The effect of the sharp thrusts 
at the Indian, especially the Gioux, simply drove him to the 
west until he could retreat no further. 
The wall which stopped the retreat of the Indian was the 
mining ca®ps of iMontana• between 1862, and 1865 the diggings 
at Bannack, Virginia City, liutte, and Helena had lurfcd thou*-
sands of peopie into the area and as the towns ̂ rew up around 
the digginf̂ e they formed a barrier to the Indian tribes. The 
main point of attach for the savages was then concentrated on 
the i.ines of eiaigration into the mining regions. 
i'hese lines of emigration became part of the aray's next 
policy and this policy lead the soldiers directly into ;iontaaa. 
The first line of forts along Lha emigrant routes was estab­
lished in i-iinrietiota and extended we«t to the mouth of the 
iiif Horn iiiver in Hootana, This line soon faded in its im­
portance ae another raore direct route into the minef- was 
founded by Johii bozeaan alon̂ r the faâ d ijoaeaan Trail. The 
line of forts alonsr this route brouf̂ ht the first fort into 
vii 
Montaiui with t})ie edtabjULahnont of Fort i« F. Smith. Howaî ri 
tha Sioux vigorouaiy resisted the effort of the $krmy to keep 
this Xijie open, #iui forced its eXoimre in 1̂ 69* The IndifiOis 
refused to sign a treaty of peace to end the hostilities that 
hivd existed as loî  as the BoMum trail was opeo« They woitî  
not 'eiren eonsideir ̂ |̂ tiatia|i;. wi||i.. th#' t«!idte, offioialji until 
the liiie o/'.Xoi(̂ s-''a|oi%.''the:-'trail ws-i utaNaô oned#' I9 tlte ehd./. 
the federal government gave in to their denandŝ  forcing the 
amy to leave the Poiider E:3«ver. cimiitfy« The treaty î icHb 
follOMed with the Sioux gave thea entire control of the dis-
l̂ tiKi area and forOade any white the right to enter. 
The aiip̂ iig centers of Montana continued to grew as the 
r̂oaOle over the Boseman Trail was in progress* Virginia 
City reaehed a pop̂ ation of alaest 10,until new diggings 
were discovered and the population irihiifted to these new lodes* 
Helena grew into pr<»Bineace with the discovery of gold in 
Last Qhanoe CKilch» and the population took on a peraaneney 
that was lacking in other gold emp9 meh as Montana City, 
Jefferson City, Silver City, and î iaaond City. The stsa»* 
Oeat landing of Fort Benton Oecaaie a thriving aetropolls. In 
the Qftllatiti Valley, Bozeaan City asî MHKl the £o*vl of a sturdy 
faming toiin .'ts over 3>000 settlers took up their hemes in the 
valley* Other ranchers and faraers hegan raoviî  out froa the 
mining t<»m8 to the rich farm laiids of the Sun and Oearborne 
River aẑ as* 
*iii 
This grovdng population aoon cane into conflict with tha 
Indian tribea that roaoed the Territory. The I»diians deeply, 
resented the Intrusion of their lands by the t̂ tes* They 
grew angry as they watched the destruction of the iHiffalo and 
other gane upon which their very existence depended* Trouble 
r also arose fros the great .difjterences in the %%ite and red 
flian̂ s •HM$e|> of Seither i>arty eomld understand th# 
ways or the other. The Indians considered it a »ark of dti« 
tiiaction to bevable to steal horses, î ile the ̂ hite iun , 
considered horse stealing; a great Idrong. He punished the 
Indian the saaua as any criminal by inflicting the death 
penalty in rough western fashion* In retaliatî * the Iŝ aa 
believed In an eye for an eye ai»i iiould itill any n̂ ite Mil he 
cane in contact with* 
At Fort Benton in 1366, trmible arose that Mi$istrat*s 
this point very well* Two wembers of the Blackfeet nation 
were killed by irate citisens for stealing horses, snd in re* 
taMntion, ten white men were killed by the aroused Indians* 
As a result, imrest spread over the area forcing the Iiuiian 
agent to ask for ailitary protection for the Fort Benton 
agency* 
Other conflict spread over the Territory* To the south 
of i>enton, near Helena, the Clarke faodly were killed by the 
Indians because they refused to accede to the red nails wishes* 
In the Yellowstone Vaxley, John Hoseaan was killed by the 
1*. -• 
Iikiilaattf aa Ita node doim the iraJJLay with a eottpaaion* Thaae 
and ether iî laneea of the growing tension hetween the Indians 
and the settl;ers it>rou#tt the arŝ  into Montana* 
Xt was not the duty of the aroy to determine n̂ ethex̂  the 
poiiey- 'tin#:,4t. was %o mavrnJiXy right or 'm>t«' The. 
did not dwcside iritio had th|i rightful oXain to the luadt 
'I't'waŝ 'Senl''' i'nt'o Mcntana. to; protefit ,thev̂ .̂i!̂ riean'citi.Mrns 
aẑ ' to open '1̂ ;: territory,, to settlwaeiit*' This 'thesis' 'is 
written to eeiiii'r thê 4:iilJUtĵ ,';'Ŝ  ̂ laid <lo.ŵ ':.aiid folleŵ  
the axû  in entering aiid opeoing; oentral Montana t» settle* 
mint* 
The ,.lJ»e of /6î pi;'that 1̂ ' to- the ŝ .lleiientMontana... 
^  "  ' l i f e ;  ,  '  V  ' '  
heĝ  wiî  the constructiMi the other main 
artery ef trî fic into the texritorŷ  the Missouri River. 
This line erlginated when C«itp Cookm. was oulXt attthe ooutii 
of tlMn #«̂ ith River* It was exteiMled to ?ort Benton̂  and then 
to its western terminus, IPort Shaw* fnim Shaw, the line curved 
to the south, then east, into the Gallatin ?alley i4)ere Fort 
Ellis was kmilt* To clear the eentx̂  portion of Mcmtana, the 
liiM from Ell̂ s proOed to the north î en Fort Logan was ereeted. 
The line eiê ed with the estaOUtahnent of Fort Magic.ni6 in the 
heart of itontana* 
After the line of forta had heen constructed, the final 
phase of the î y proĝ tm wss imt into operation, the laying 
of militaxy roads to ê nn̂ t the posts and to serve as llnea 
JC 
of defease ajgalimt Indieae Mwatderlfiis ItAnkJpiil Ko9tMui» 
l̂ th |i«*eteet̂  ̂ furniehî  lif tl̂ e arv̂ _̂  by XidO t̂ e 
SHaia of eentrel Montena wee detted ifitli ferae* ranclMiiî  
eettieneats* By lt$5, there nee no Xonger e need fer tlie 
erwy.̂ ' rpaein to pro.teot the.;.3peepipe:'ef t̂ he rê cwî y ̂ 
Mrmy eiieioKionedp&â ttf ImmUng %hff, fe|€ild' la»4 
msâ  ̂
3 a 
V • ̂  
Smith 

CHAPtliR II 
IMulAS UPEISiKGiJ AHxj ASm PUiaslÛ Lt-KT 
iiy î 60, the IndJLans couid look oack on a Aong iin® of 
removiflt'f fpofli\os¥t to fore#-of civlIiiBat'ioiii'•; 
pressed â jktftsi-• For iodlked ke-if tJiey. would . 
stiiX ae able to retain enouî  of tî e Trans-Mi ssisaippi West 
for •'Iji/'fijI't.aHpJe'hii^ of th®^ elen «l.o';>hunt and fish, ̂ '4 toam 
over as they pleased, Dut that hope dwindled n̂d died eoon 
after 1850. 
The so-called 'Indian Country.,*̂  which had oeen eet aside 
for the Indians exclusive use forever, had la?ted scarcely 
fifteen years aefore the crutah of civiiiâ tion again preased 
3 irresietiuiy at their oorders. Trappers, miners, adventurers. 
X. Frederic i>» Paxjcii, 
x910), p. x2. *̂ .*,iBany frontier® had ueen created and 
croseed in the We&ttvard the seaiuoard, the falls 
xine, •••, the Ohio Vai.ley, the x.ist.iaeippl... 
2. Kafen ami nister. ̂ esteyn Aaerica> (rjew Xork, 1941), P, 
233. a soiid wull of Indian Countrj* from the Ked 
iUver to Green isay au:Ki M&ke -lichifian faced the Missiiwi-
' ppi Valley white settlements." Paxson, OP. Ŝ *» p. 31. 
"ine Indian frontier j .. .had oy lfJ40 oeen carried into 
fact and existed unoroken fror« ...Texas to the j-akes." 
3. liooert UiegejL, Asaerica Moves jaat, (liew York, x930), pp» 
400-402. A treaty in Iffl took land from the Sioux of 
Minnesota for white settlement. In lf?51, the north pxain 
Indians, ̂ heyenne, Assifti*>oin, Crow, Cros Vtsutres, ;sho-
shone, Artipaho, and uioux, frttve the United States the 
right to auild roads across this continent, in 1353, Kan­
sas and part of lieor̂ aka were purchsed from the Indiims. 
and settlers , pushed farther and farther acroBs the Hieoie*̂  
Blppi Into their hoffleiaada, rougl jty ijruiifeiiik̂  aside tliy red 
mmi as they came in contact with him. It oeeame InctQaein^ly 
Clear to the Xndidn that 8(̂ e fiî l aolution must reached 
aoon or hie cause woui.d oe hopd4««ei. 
As th« situation 6ecm*» mope and «oî  pressinĵ  do the 
Xndî iis of the frontier, the iiiflû cis of the youn̂ r̂ 
who were more thaii. wiiiiog to fifrht to remove the initruder«,' 
gained in strength* Also, the idea that they must oislc# a 
stand for the recognition of their righte oecaise more and 
more apparent to tiia Indians. 
Svtt, it wa# not untiX the ueginning of the Civil Sar 
that the Indians saw their chance. The main areao of the 
conflict were limited to the more settled parts of the oor<}er 
states and the vrea of the l̂ orthwesi was ip;nored to a great 
exten̂ ,. The Indians soon found that they could ccMamit their 
raids and depredations without touch fear of punishment or 
reprisal. 
i'his attitude f:raduaxly spread over the frontier. The 
government and the army did little to correct the situation 
until their attention was drawn sh?irpxy and violently to the 
proulem by the Indian uprisings in Minnesota, ĥea, a depart 
DBGnt of the Korthwest was added to the artny coraaand to oring 
the upper Mississippi and î isiouri Eiver areas under military 
6 
protection. General John Pope wias placed int ca«aand of the 
departcsent. 
General Pope*8 first assignment was to solve the situation 
creatod t>y a dxmlcen band of Sioux Indians who had massacred 
a jeproup of white settlers at Acton» î linnesota, on August id, 
1̂ 62, and had fled to a tribe under i-ittle Crow for protection. 
Realising tĥ t̂ retrioution would prouably include all of the«j 
the whole eroup decided to continue the butchery, and soon 
hundreds of savages were o|i the warpsth, scalping a.en, violat­
ing and killing wĉ en, ueatlng out the orains of infants, and 
comraitting all the hideous cruelties practiced in Indian war­
fare. Terror aud despair reigned throughout Minnesota until 
regulars under f'ope gained control, ind either drove the hŝ s-
tilee from Mnnesota or removed tĥ  peamahiy to lands outside 
of the state, n̂y of the Indiana were imprisotmd and tried* 
Finally, in tiecember, 1862, thirty-eight of the leaders were 
hanged on a single scaffold at Mankato.̂  
Thus, the army program of gradually driving the Indians 
to the west aiitd north, out of the path of the frontier of 
All further references to these records will ue noted 
simply as Official Records. 
5. liis P. Oberholtaer, A History of the Unlted states 
ace Civij. war. U'ewiork, 1917)» Vol. I, p. J40. 
settxemont was inaugurated. In the years that fallowed, an " 
annual progra&i of warfare was pj.anne4 to hold tho Indians in 
check and to puah the® farther and farther west, until the 
ctining frontier aî ithe frontier of sett4e«ent ĥ prnmed them 
"into •'itfael4':©<ifrner|Of'Bontainaj.'ffhirî  slana of the 
Sldux was. ai#4ei 
At the saoe time that the Sieux were driven from Minneaotfi 
.repdrti?< tiegiarf, there were 
of douthern sympathisers aaonî  the eiaployees and offieere 0f 
the fur coopaniii'of'tî  Upper Missouri that the Indianff 
were securing ams and supplies tjpom the Metle ef the Red lliver 
eoHintry, and the the iirltish tradei*» were urging the tri&ed to 
resist the advance of the white settxers*̂  To invedtigA'te •>. 
these reports, and t̂ o ostaijllsh routes of travel with protect<-
g-
Ion for the emigrants who were i>«|̂ nning to streaa in ever 
larger ntUBuers Into the laining regions of the MorthweetY the 
amy started its' oa«ipa|||n In the Northwest which ultimately 
Drought It into Montana with an era of permanent estactxish* 
ments through the construction of Fort C. F. Ĉ oith, 
6. Saauei. N. î otta, "Report of, in Report of ̂ e secretary of 
Interî ,̂ ** Ifoû  Exeeutive ̂ ocuaent> Ko* 1, (Wâ hin̂ oa, 
1662)f Third Session, 37th Congress, Vol, il, p* >67. 
7 .  nrigadier General Aif. Sully, '̂ i.etter to General Culrtis,* 
Officii Records. Vol. ZLVIll, Series 1, Part I, p. 9w» 
MtiiML̂ l̂ rf»4r4P̂ ,̂ ''f«e62S?ieP<>*'t of," Md<s > 
8 
To investigate the reports coming in from the Sorthyieat 
and to secure a foothold in the area, the anay sent Captain 
ii. Greer and Cottpany I, 30th Wiaconain InfaQtry, to Fert 
9 Union in the spring of i663. The following springi they 
were relieved oy Captain ̂ saery Upton with Company ii, Ist 
Volunteers, who had Q̂ nlers to turn the fur company people dUt 
of the fort* All were removed except Charles x.arpenteur, and 
the army reoained inacontrol of the fort until it was ahaiuloii#-
ed in the fall.̂ O 
Indian unrest continued following the; Minnesota aijaesacî , 
and in 1̂ 6}, another caaiî aign waa atâ ped out whieh drove the 
Sioux faziî her to the west and nerth. General Sully and Ql»it« 
eral Sioleŷ '̂ r̂ched separate coltunns into the upper Miaî irl 
region. Sully froffi Slotitx City, and ̂ ioiey froai souUiem Minne­
sota. Their plan to ccpbine for a decisive campaign against 
the Indians above Fert Flerre'̂  ̂was wrecked by Sullŷ 's epltufen 
being delayed for xack of supplies, and only individual 
9. Merrill Jjurxingame, |i|& yitaUtr* CHeiwa, 1942} 
p. 110. 
10. Elliot coues, iasifei Tĝ  a ins, Mbssi: Mil-
souri. (New York, 1393J, Vol. II, p. 3W. 
charge of the district of Iowa. 
i2. Fort Pierre was located at the present «ite of the city 
of Pierre, »>outh Jakota. 
operatio!̂ £ were aceoffip4.ishe<i. £)oth laet and defeated bands 
aQ# ttî /wer© forced to return at the end of 
the season, Suily was at>ie to estauiish Fort niiiy, thoû  
,1 
the Ii|;Jiane *efr# Aot deeisiireiy defeated. 
t̂ore detali<ed plans were worked out durlnî  the winter 
for a campaign into th%iupper Missouri to once and for all 
nest and defeat the hostile Indians. I'hese plans were only 
]̂ art of a greater policy, however, a policy which pointed th# 
airtBy*e moveiaents directly toward Montana, iliis policy was 
one to establish !ailitaz*y posts alon̂  the northern routes of 
emigration into the llorthwest mining regions. 
By January» iBoU, plans had been worked out which caxled 
for the estaollsbaient of four posts to oe constructed oa a 
line of travel from Minnesota to the isines. One post was to 
be on the south side of iievil*8 î ke, as near as convenient 
to the western extremity of the lake, to accomodate three 
infantry ccmpaniea and five compaoies of cavalry, the second 
post was to be built on the Ĵ ies ̂ iver, nearly straisht west 
of Fort AbercrcMBoie, to accomodate three infantry and five 
cavalry coffipanies. i'he third, a four infantry company and a 
battalion cavalry post, was to be located on the Î issouri 
River at, or near, the aouth of Long juake. the fourth, and 
13. General Alfred Sully, "Expedition Against the Indians in 
iJakota," Official Kecords. Vol. Xlll, Series I, Part I, 
pp. 555-561. 
a© 
l&st» post was to tie soaewhere on the Yellowstone Eifer,/not 
more than olies auove the trading post of Aiexandenf. 
Iftell marked trails were to iî e ial4 out uatween these posts 
and were to be opened as soon as posBioie."**̂  
y in connection idth';: the mw jtlaa,, for, the,,.̂  th« ibmf 
jcantiniied the, da®, of pushing tsack •:th#?Indiaft«*V'-4:r«iŝ  
was napped out against the c<mt>ined triues of the 
and Tet̂ n end ̂ e ot̂  ̂
blckeking all Missouri River traffic to the goldfieldn of the 
Horthwest. eoffioined cavalry force of the Mdî hwdst l̂ epart-
»ent was to oe concentrated under Sully • s coomand* %e Xova 
force of Sully* s aoout 1300 strong, was to wove to f©rt 
Pierre and then up the Missouri to the laoutb of Bordache Creek, 
while four companies of Infantry were to follow up the river 
oy boat with supplies. At Bourdaehe Greek, the cavalry frc« 
General Sioley*s comaand from Minnesota, aooat I6DO sten who 
were to travel across country to that point, were to Joi n 
15 
Suxly aiKi move from there according to General Bully's plan. 
These plans were well on the way to perfection 4>y March. 
However, on M«rch 14, H. H« Haxlack, Secretary of War, wrote 
' • i  
General Pope statinf/ that reiiaule sources had informed the 
14. Major General John Pope, Tel. XliiV, op. eit.. p. o22. 
15- Major Menerai John Pope, '̂ Kxpeditlon Â rainst the Sioux 
Indians in î ôta territory," S£MSsSl Ssfisfils. 
Xi.1, Series 2, Part I, p. 135. 
11 
War iJepartment that the main esaî ration froffl the Mestera states 
to the northvieat JBihiiig region in the spring wotiid move hf a 
new route. This emigration would aove fro® Fort Kearney past 
Fort Laramie, thence north crosaing the Po*«ier River near th» 
laottth of Wliiovf Creek, striking the Yellowatone aiid tta' trtb-
tttaries where gold was found in î rgesi, quantities. HalXn&k 
ttlsQ stated that in all pro&aoilities this eiaigratlon route 
would require oixitary protectioa throu|sK XMiOf cmmtry 
from the vicinity of Fort Laraeaie to the leilowstoile. Ke was 
quite correct in this atateioent, for the iiosedMin frail, as 
the route was named, was under continuax attack uy the Î iiaQs. 
In regard to the aoveBteat̂  of the eaigrants, it had beea 
proposed to the War Department that part of Sully *s ej;p«ditioii, 
which was now oeing organised, move up the tviourara or Mprth 
Cheŷ oe River and establish « post on the Powder Bitirer aad 
one at the mouth of the '-•ig Horn *Uv«r. The Big Horn post 
was to l>e supplied uy steaiser, which was reported, could nav­
igate the Yellowstone that f&r, and perhaps â ovf* Hallack 
nade it clear that he did not want to sake any ohal̂ (e8 in the 
planned expedition, that he felt due consideration sliould 
1  ^  
oe laado to the oiatter* 
General Pope immediately wrote Sully of thie deveiop«#nt, 
enclosing the letter frocn Hallack, and adding a few of his 
16, Q€;neral io Haixack, "**ett,«.r to Pope," Dfflcial "Ĵ c-
 ̂ V61« ISirfeii i, fart IXpp. 607» wl. / 
12 
own ideas on the stuUjiect. Pope pointod out that the aatto]̂  
of the fort on the XeiXowstone was already tdken care of in 
the original plans, for if it were practicauie for ooata to 
travel to the mouth of the Jiig Horn, perhaps it would oe 
• -  . 3 , ,  ^  ^  . . r  
bettet' to locate the tellowstone post at that point* Howeyfer, 
on the Blatter of th® Powder River post, Pope left the .problem 
to Sully to judge for himself after he had exaaincd the 
Oountry. ^e added that whatever protection Sully could glvei 
to the eai«:rants, ieither fros Laramie, or imy other point 
within his district without jeapardizing the success of the 
eaapaign and the ustaiiDlishfflent of the military posts should 
be i;iven them.̂  ̂
i3oth Pope and Sully finally â x eed that the post on the 
Powder lliver could oest be located and supoxicd fros Fort 
Laraisie, arKt informed Hallack of their decision. The post 
on the Yellowstone would stili. ue established uy Sully, out 
it would not ue ouilt above the head of navi|;ation on that 
river.-̂  ̂
Havinî  settxed the prouiem of the necessity of dividing 
his cooumand. Sully returned his attention to the final prep­
arations for the trip against the coroi>iaed tribes of the 
17• Major General John Pope, "Letter to Suxlv." ioid«. p. 713. 
18. Major General John Pope, "i-etter to Halxack,* Official 
Records. Vol. Series I, Part II, P. l62. 
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.Dakota Nation, who had allied their scattered tl*iue8 for a 
finai dfjTbrt against the ivhites. ,liiirS,ng the winter, these 
Indians had combined iad now, they began conoentratlng their 
î ole force on, or near, the upper Missouri to resist all 
navl̂ kl̂ î n' oil the river, to prevent the passage of eaigrants 
across the great plains, and to deliver with their coabined 
forces a final battle against the United States troops under 
General Sully« The IxKlians had anticipated that the troops 
wonuld be sent against them. Their combined forces were est-
iaated to oe aoout 6,000 warriors, and was later conrfiraed 
as such.̂  ̂
General Sully collected his forces from th« varicms posts 
and stations in his district early in the spring, and coouMsneed 
to ttove up ths Missouri, leaving only saall detachnents here 
and there to cover the frontier from the minor Indian raids, 
which could be exp4icted. At the same time, General Sibley 
collectod his men and sent them across the plains to tiordache 
Creek. The Junction of the two columns was made on June 30* 
However, the spring rise of the Missouri River did not come 
until later, and the cosuaand encountered trouble passing 
supplies up the river. It was not until July 7> that they 
reached the mouth of the Cannon Ball Eiver and established 
19. "Expedition Against the Sioux Indians in Dakota Teri*itory," 
££• Sii'f P. ̂ 35. 
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a strong }M»fit as a dep̂ ot for suppliea, iiaaed Fort Hic«» The 
1̂ 9t was garrisoned with five ̂ (HQpaRies of the 30tH 1iiid«onsiii 
Voiunteers.̂  
In the i&eantime, tbe lekdians who had cQncentrated 4iiXy 
T%fty ..alios »0ove the 'site 'of Fort Eiee>«Mved'"'t»ad|: akd aor<̂ s« 
. - t h e  M i s s o u r i  ̂ t o  t h e  i i e s t : ! .  t a ^ n g I t r o n g I n  a  
f$ry difficult country near the Little Missouri River. 
General Sully arraji|̂  ̂his coiwand for the majr̂ ili into 
the Iifdlahs* choice of hittieground« ' His oosaauMid consisted 
of 2,200 Bion, lÂ luding the Minnesotit Cavalry, eleven 
eostpaniei 6th Iowa Cavtti;ry, 3th Minnesota Volujvteeira (nouiited} 
three coapanies 7th Iwa Cavalî , two coapaiUes ifiilcota Cavalry 
one sraall ĉ pany of scouts» and four laountain hoititsers. A 
large parity of eiaigrants had followed the soldiers who had 
eome friMa Minnesota. They were allowed to foileii the ̂ lunn 
as Sully could not furnish then idth supplier aiki an escort 
to take then back into sê tĴ <$ country. 
.Ob the 26th of Jul̂ yy the location of thd l̂ stil̂  Indian 
At/':-
canp was fouiKt, and the eodgrant tjrliin was eorhued at the 
head of Heart liiver with an adequate guard, the flirting 
oolunn then prepared for a rapid naroh ««ith onxy pack amies 
with supplies to accoapaoy then* Here one of the blunders 
20a ''Ex.pedition Against the 5ioux Indians in iJaiota Territory 
op. cit*, pp. 133''i-55* All of the renainiag Infcarnation 
in ttdLs chapter is taken fros this report. 
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the qaartoriuiater is notsd for oocurred, First ao •addio 
X̂ankets couXd f<HtRd for the aiAle»« Mien fl̂ sMJr this 
problem was renedied with gunAj saeks, it was found that iSH-
stead of the regular six*iaoh wehbed pack ciat̂ ŝ  thtre inlre 
Oiily threei»inch hard leat̂ her belis# These galled the ouies; 
sOt>hadXy that they went wild and pitched aupplifa over aoî a 
of prairie* wagons were finally put into use, fad the 
expedition traveĵ id rapidly toward the hostiles' 04̂ . (hi 
the 2$th, they reached the camp î iich proved to be ooiaposed 
of Unkpapes, Sans Arcs, Blackfeet* MinneconJou8» tanlito&ais 
SioMJC, and Santee Sioux. The caaip was located ior̂ a wooded 
etmntty, much cut up with hiiĝ , rugged hilXs and deep, iapaaw 
•able ravines# For auout an hour a council was held with speie 
of the Indian chiefa of the group, uut they proved so defiant 
and umuufiageabie that the council was abandoned aiad prepar#*̂  
tlofis were suide for the coming battle. 
As it was iaipossible for cavalry to charge over the 
rough terrain̂  the taen disaKmated, each fourth jaan taking 
charî  of that winy horses, While the rest began to advance 
on footi Sharp ai»i severe action enaued, but the artillery 
and lon range smalJ iirme c .ht lOps proved too destruct­
ive and the Indiî s aaoa begc:a to <f* way. They wii:iNsi so 
Ci.osely pressed that they were forced to aottndon their 9̂  
tensive camp, leaving all their robes, lodges, colts, utsnsdls 
of all discription, and all their winters' supply of 
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proiriBloQa, So aurt w«r« they of defeating the idiitM̂  t&sy 
JKad not evan botbered tp stH-ke ttelr êiraa thoogjhi tkef 
h«d at least a d a]r!̂ ji8ti.ce of the approacfh of ths eoluaa. 
The aetion continued in a running fiĝ t of nine ttilas, 
iN̂ ea the Indians filially scattered efmpletely and escaped with 
nothing kmt their woui»ied, idiieh, according to th« Indian 
custom, they caẑ  ̂off with as many of their dead as they 
eoitld« One hundred twenty*five Indian dead were left on the 
field of battle for a loss of five killed and twsilii&y wounded 
for the soldiers, ay nî tfall the Iiuiians had disappear*̂ * 
and the cuX'oran rested* The next isorMpgy while part of the 
cavalry r̂ aained to destroy the Indian ea«p by fir̂ , tibe 
remainder atteapted to catch the fleeing Indians. 
Having oAly vnall supply of provisions and lit̂ tle aeans 
of carrying what he did have, and ascertaining that the retreat 
of the Indieuas was to the southwest, Sully returned with his 
aen to tho train at the he«dl of Reiirt Kllrer and resuaed his 
aarch thrm»#i the unexplored bsdlands of Bakota to build the 
fort oii the Tell̂ ifstone. 
The guides for the expedition informed Sully thfltt it 
was impossible to cross straight west toward Fort Alejcaxider, 
and that it would be necessary to detour far to the south and 
then cross over, hitting the Tellowstone near tho aoath of 
the I'owder Eiver, This, however, would take several weeks, 
making it impossible to contact the uoats which were to meet 
«xp«dition at the head of navigation on the leXiowatone 
al̂ t the XOth of August* It was also dlseovered thst an 
•rr&r in eomissary supplies left Uten now with only atiout 
iix days rations. A Sio«ax guide was finally found who had 
heen thrcmn̂  the region on several war expeditions and . 
thî jgHt tha| he could lead a wagon train over the r«nits* 
On August the ciOBraand ewM ia sight of the INtd l«i»ls 
«rf ̂ e Julttie Missouri ,1 the la|>act of î ch caused Slitly to 
-î te; 
»••• It was grand, disauil, and aaisstic. Tou eaii l̂ nag-* 
iae a deep oasin, SOO fset deep ana twsntŷ five idlsM in 
diasNiter, filled with a nuniMir of cones and oven̂ shitpsd 
lû olls or all siims, froai twenty feet to several hmbdî  
fssit hl|̂ , s<metl«es by th4tiBHlelves, soatetines piled up 
Into large heaps on top of one another, in all eoncslv* 
able shapes aî  CQnfiision. Ifsst of these hills were of 
a gray cXaŷ  but SMiny of a 11̂ 1̂  color, of h«̂ t 
elayi little or im veget«ti0fif« 'SiiMiii of the sidss df the 
hillit iHHievex, were ei»*rered witĥ a few scrub 
mswftd Ift the dlstapŝ  ̂ fWlooted exactly llts 
tSs fuins of aixx"-
tk9 bî ands bordered the Mttls Missduri on both 
sides#, eo 
with:..̂ sp̂  'It'̂  ws#"Wit̂ t̂i|est' 
Isbor 4̂  Ĵ is of tiae that a narr̂  wlî iag way betwsett 
ths î vloeSf in places only ten feet idLds, was found for 
ths vm§m train. 
IQills still in the badlands Sully eiocountered the 
ladi»is ̂ at had been defeated on the 2dth» and scored 
ŝ thf̂  striking victory* The Xndiiuis again fled, leaving 
€«r®r iCKJ d«ad on the field. Sully reported that this battle 
t>r@k« tiMi spirit of the o<»s3t>id«̂  trioes, and they split into 
0mtpm̂  asnae heading into Canada, but the greater part 
heading southwest. 
i#aviiig tha badlaBds, the expedition' traveling on i/3 
a'grasfihopp«r denuded' prairis*- 'aany of 
the anisMls died, finally reached l̂ e lellowiifoiie on the 12th 
•"of ̂ *̂ gttSt, fojî uiiateljf they fouî of .the tWee ' 
ipH&ll'''stiirii<*whfel stê aswrs, eaoh oax̂ ing'̂ 50 "-tona of ̂ supplies,., 
for then. The boats, the gllpRfij emum and the 
ftmad that the river was falling ra£d4iy« >̂<1̂  it beeane 
neeeasî  to liĵ ten thest by loading wagons with their cargo 
Icmt&tm î ey were abla to return to the Missouri. A third 
boat, the IslaiKi Citv. had hit a snag near Fort Union and had 
wmic, carrying with it nueh com for the aniaals and soiae 
material for the post to have been estauliif̂ ed on the Tellow-
8toiM> Mver. 
Sully f<»ind that the Intilding of the tollowstone post 
would not be practicable aiKi reported, **The loss of one of ay 
b<M|t«t the impossibility of getting boats this late up Uie 
river, and the want of grass preventing ate frcn hauling 
tft&ms- several hundred niles up the river will show you the 
raasbn." Croatsing the Yellowstone, the conaaiwi spreî  out 
in iMuiner to gl«an as £QUch of the sunburnt 
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grass for tha animals as poasitile, and aov6d doum the river 
toward the Missouri. 
the 20th of Augustri 1;hey reached Fort Unit>n attd 
jp̂ ssed to the north side of the Missouri. At this painty 
the emigrant train turned to the west aiKl left the exiwditloni 
hoifaver, not befoiHi ste*iin£ part of the horses, aules, and 
arais of the troops* 
Although ffndinjg tort Union in a dilapidated ct̂ dition— 
aliBOSt falling to pieees—>Sully left the stores intended for 
the Yellowstone post there in charge of Ceapany I, 13th Wiŝ  
CKmslQ infantry» who were to resaain the:ra all winter. 
The ooats were seat down the river with the sifik and 
the wounded aboard, and tha cavalry column moved east toward 
Fort ierthold. They reached it on the 2dth, and Captain 
Moreland aiKl C(»ttpaay G, 6th Iowa Cavalry were left to gar­
rison the fort, as it proved to be a likely place to supply 
the fort to tie esta4>lished near 0evil*8 î ake. •̂ aviî  the 
river̂  the party traveled toward the lake in search of the 
Tanktonais i4io, reports stated, might have been canning 
there. Howeveri after spending several days in the Haison 
du Butte country and finding that the Indians had 
probably gone into Canada, the expedition continued on doim 
to Fort Rice, reaching thet̂  on September S. 
It was at Fort <:ace that Sully began securing evidence 
of the success of his expedition, for several chiefs of 
trib»o Mho had met defeat under his coamaiid easie in asking 
for peaee. Some reported the tanktoik̂ s Sloû  t»ex« in Oaaada 
in a starving condition* and that the]r desired to »ali» f̂ aee* 
Othera pointed out that they reaiiised it wse futile to fi|̂ t 
any and that t̂ ey wcHild ii«ver go to war 'AiX, pt 
1̂ 1# pleased Sully no end«, and he wrote ̂ hat it «Ottld aeirer \ 'I 't: - ••• 
be: ik̂ fliiî ury 'for atn4ith«|r- ex|»$<dî i.<(m'.''m. ̂ ''li'̂ ô 'thit'' itorl̂ hwe-at̂  
"for the Indians entix̂ ly''Sub4itiKated. , 
osi if tlie river had been hi|̂ |̂ r;;:thiQRO «rould''ĥ vp̂ : 
bet̂ rt' i'nd it icKild' hite-. Hĉ eeib.'''|̂ iĥ 'ble to eatabiiî  ;:ilie. pb»t 
en the Tellowstone. It was a |»r)̂ >l<Mi to decide 
place the post thei%, î or* fr̂ ' a-iM'î tary polni.;:'!]̂  it .. 
WMs probably beat to put it at l̂ e oiouth of the l̂ inidAr M 
but from what he had seen attd heard of the XellbiretfiMiM Valley 
it would be exceedingly httrd to g#t for any 
ed tbezNS. Yet, Sully pointed <̂ tj the post on the fellow* 
9t<»te should oe built as soon as possible* 
Before Sully could disband his sen mmi #6nd Iwcic to 
their posts, he received wori that Captain Fisk mA a party 
of ettigrants woĝ g' -suŝ founded oy Indians sod in iiited of assis* 
tance to continue on their way towards Idaho, axî  fits forced 
to send 550 infantry and 3Ĉ  cavalry to bring fiî  to 
Fort Rice* The Fi&k party had attearp>t«d to follont the path 
laid but by Sully on hifi way to the lellowftb̂ e and had bê n 
attacked just before reaching the badlands by about 100 sav4iges 
The Indians abandoned the attack before the reecolng party 
arrived, and though Fl«k was flra In his stand that he, umb 
going to keep on tol«ard the mst, when the gx̂ ater part of 
his train started to return with the escort, he was forced 
to accc»apany them. The par*ty reaehed Fort Eiee 30tlg 
q£ 3ept>enher, and the XS64 Northwest Indian Expeditidn <;«ae 
to a successful conclusion and disbanded. Sooe returned to 
Hinnesota via ?ort Wiuisworth eacon̂ ing part of the Msk' 
eoî ants* Soue were ordered south to fight iia ttie .fiviX 
tfar* The rest traveled overland to Siojuic City escorting a 
governoent train and the remainder of the Fisk eoigraiits* 
General Sully nms convinced that everything hsd been a 
success 9xemjp>t the constructibn of the fort on the fellow-
stons, iriliich still remained in the planning stage* 
8ut General Sully had failed to take into consider­
ation the plight of the Indians he had driven to the south­
west, coacentriting them in the lands of the Cheyennes and 
Cttamf directly. il̂  the of thf nain route of cniiipration 
to the gold fields of Montana. Here, it seeaed, was the 
last hunting ground aiKi hoiae left for the Sioux. To the 
west the ainingr frohtinr was rapddly filMiing tip axui over-
Jriowing into the fertile valleys east of tjie mountains. 
Te the east the agricultural frontier was slowly creeping 
up on them, preceeded by the amy. Mow, even this final 
Sanctuary of the Indians was being tbr̂ Mtened by the steady 
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fXdw of emigrants oyer the new iioxeaan trail# Saali wonder 
the Indians gave notice that they would resist aay attempt 
to keep this short route, via the Platte, Eig Hoini, aiw! 
Yellowstone Rivers, open to emigration. 
CHAPTER ill 
THE POWDEB RIVER laPEDlTICH 
Thusj it caste to pass that another aiî itary expeditioa 
had to be planned for early in 1065 to again, finally and 
ever, put down the threat of a general Indian uprising, 
expedition was known as the Powder River Indian Ŝ pSdsH 0̂  
Ition, and was made necessary oeeause the Sioux were again 
desperately trjring to keep the iirihites fro» inVadiisg theilp 
hottteland. 
At the saê  tioe that the army was planning on a final 
att«»Bipt to cnash Indian resistance In the l»orthweat|, Congress 
was fldloidng an interest in opening new routes of travel into 
the laliting regions. On March 3t 1̂ 65* it authorised an ex-
pediticm to survey and lay out a route fr€»a the mouth of the 
Niobrara fiiver in iieoraska Territory, west into the Platte 
and Yellowstone valleys to Virî nia City* Colonel James A* 
Sawyer was assigned the task of surveying this route."̂  
While lawyer was asking his preparations for the trip 
and gathering his men at the mouth of the Nioorara, it oeê  ̂
exceedingly clear tĥ t the surveying expedition could not 
1. "Wagon Koad Frcaa liiourara City to Virginia City,** Ĥ se 
Execative jjocumeats. Kuupaoer First Session« 39th 
:Coâ e88, tiaî ington, 1365), Volû  p« 11. 
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procecKi until the planned expedition into the Powder River, 
Tongue, and Eose&ud Hiver, had cleared the way. 
The Powder Kiver Indian Expedition wâ  uî r the coismanid 
of Brevet> B̂ gadier Gefieral'P. S. Connor, ha4 oeen in 
ceiDmanad of the district of the Piatfia* ' H@ nov̂ ci his head-
(̂ artere frtwa Utah to Fort l̂ araiaie to plan for th« expeditioja# 
Pope notified Connor in the apritî  jof ld65 that he ahould 
rush hi a preparations so that his ejcpedition t̂ ould prmpm̂ A 
the Sawyer surveying group.̂  
Originally, the amy had planned to conduct two exped­
itions into the southern poxi;ion of Montanî . QenermX Sully 
was to take an expedition up the Miaaouri River to tort 
Pierre, then cross over into the Black Hilla and continue 
on to the Powder River, vdiere he was to establish a post, 
ĥis post was to t>e aoout 150 ailes north df ̂ qxt î aranie. 
In conjunction with this plan. General Connor wns to take his 
men from Fort î amie and travel north and west into the 
lellowstone Vaxley near the isouth of the Hoisebud River, 
thereby, the two cowmands could work a pincher aovement on 
the hontiles -r/r 9 ̂ re known to be concentrateo in the iilaclt 
Hills regie 
2. Major OeneraA John Pope, "i-etter to î odge and Connor," 
Official Records. Vol. XLVIII, Serie* I, Part il, p. 756. 
3. Major General Jno Pope, "Letter to Connor," Ibid.. p. 237* 
However, trouble arose in ̂ linnesota, tadth the Xndiiins 
raiding the settlements in a manner aimliar to the raids 
committed in 1362. Kajor General 3. R« Curtis kept pleading 
with General Pope fot aon to hit at the seat of the Xodim 
trouulo—tlheir eanp at the north erKl of iJevil* s l.ak« in 
î akota—>until he agreed to send General iSully to put, 4ô  
the uprieinif;. Although %lly ar̂ ed Vnat ah expediticN:̂  into 
that'counilyt the Indian#; eoû d î treat._ a,;ff̂ «#-pii.e8 "̂ 1 
Canada whejre they were B&ie, was useiesst he was fore&d to 
change his pxans and move with hi® sac® towsrd î evix*s ̂ ake. 
of a necessity, the change in General Sully*s plana aad# 
it mandatory for General Gonnojr to revise his campai|̂  pxans* 
It now his duty to eeta<̂ lish the post on the Powdex' 
Riveri and also, to conduct chc campaign iuto the Yellowstone 
Valley, clearing t he way for the Sawyer survey#̂  
HtaiMiPOUc troubles ueset the ex̂ podition from the st:rt. 
î iazly of the troops mutinied, supplies were delayed, some 
never arriving, and it was a half prepared ceaipaign that 
eventually got under way.5 
The plant for the Powder River Indian iixpedition called 
for lour CQluaaie t# march into the Indian country around the 
iiAack Hills and then converge on the fioscbud ver ii : ,r Its' 
4. Major General iJohn Pope, "j-etter To Aiodge," lyid.. p. 665. 
5. Major Generiil Ju'« iPupe, "i-etter to Connor," ibid.. p. 1112. 
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confi.uBnc« with the Yeiiowstone. The right coiiiŝ  was to lae 
ct̂ ftilded uy GoionQl K. Cole of the 2nd Mlseoufi Light 
iery, with 797 alien and officers of the aamie aoniBii&i, ami JXX 
fl̂ n and officers of the i2th Mia&ouri Cavaiî , Asking a total 
for that column of l,iOd officer© and men. 
ĥls coluian wlis to proceed to the east o|̂  the Black 
Hills in Dakota Territory, laoire along its' east baao tc B̂ ftrs* 
Peak (northeaet point of the hills) where a iHrjie force of 
hoatile Indians were ŝ ipposed to ̂  cr̂ toped* Frcp Bears' Feak, 
the colî m was to proceed aroand the north uase of th« Hiile 
to the Three Peaks, then nove across country to the north 
iMise of F̂ anther l̂ ountain idiere they were to find a supply base 
and part of another coiawand. If the Indians were f̂ counterod 
near Bears* Peak, General Coonor̂ k̂  orders were to attack and 
kill every sale Indian over 12 years of age and not to receive 
any overtures of peace or suiMtission.̂  
the center oolufttn was wadar, comaand of juieutenant Colonei. 
Saouel Valker of the l6th Kansas Cavalry, with 6O0 officers 
and ffien of the saise coKimand. Walker's instructioo# were to 
proceed via Rawhide Creok through the i»iack Hills, a«u crot-a 
the headwaters of the .it "• Missouri whiie traveling in a 
niorthwesterly direction t-- the . .>r Itiver. *hen, moving 
"The Powder River Indian Expedition," House jJoetiaentŝ  
Nî lier 3̂ 9, Part I, First Session, §4tJi Congress, 
iWaahington, IS96), p. 356. 
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down the river to a point nearly opposite to the north end 
of Panther Mountain, cross in a westerly direction to the 
general rendezvous oT the four coiumha on the Hoseoud River* 
Coionei Walker received orders to kî l all male Indiana 
over li'̂ . years- of 
fhe third column w.is called the left coluan and was 
coodmnded ay Colonel J. H. Kidd, 6th Michigan Cavalry, with 
90 ol̂ î̂ ers an# aasn of th# 7̂ " Iowa Cavalry , 90 officers and 
men of the llth Ohio Cavalry, 200 officers and men of the 6th 
Michigan Cavalry, and 95 officers and men of the Pawnee 
Scouts, Baking a total of 475 officers in all. ĥe 
last coiLumi was to ye known as the west colum, and was in 
command of Captain Aloert thrown, 2nd California Cavalry, with 
116 officers and men of the aame comand, and 84 officers and 
nen of the Oiaaho Scouts, oifikinĵ  a totax of 200 officers and 
iien.7 
Each of the columns was furnished with its* own artillery. 
All the mipplies uy wagon transportation were sent Vith the 
left coluoin v̂ ich General Connor traveled with. l%e center 
column took forty days supplies on pack mules, the CQordin<» 
ated sioveaent of the columns was to ue accomplished by the 
use of snoke signals. 
7, I-tHrdr?, pp. 529-3̂ 9. -̂ 11 of the information up to footnote 
S is taken fro® this report of the expedition. 
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Qenerax Connor r«porfced th* t ho expected to e8fe®ui.i8h 
a jpost on the headwatore oĴ  either the Tongue or 
near the road to Virginia City, and that it the reach­
ed the gejtt̂ rai rendeavcrtJifi; Vfithout eacountftrlftg the Iftdiwifij 
wouM pursue 4ib«a, '*eVen as far as the Heart Mii>'«r." if 
necassary* the coliMii« diBtriUut̂  to t̂ horoû lŝ y 
s<;our the country «ijrou«d, the Rpseoudi, so-j«»t fĵ iiih«ftnt 
cout̂ #fbf-''«€n̂ ed-ta the''̂ !̂dfsiiî :%ad':-ĝ  it 
ConriW'̂ ad kftô n ja £ittx̂  fffeoultiag he heeded to ser̂  
out to find the Indiana, the reauit® of hi® eaipedition would 
"̂ lie Me ST and ieft coiuam started f rep ir'ort iiaranie 
getheri and tl'livailhg up along the gdneral route of the 
Aoseraan Trail, they passed up the south side of the Horth 
rXatte to î a Bonte Fort* Croasi&g the Flatta* the eoluana 
moved up the north side of the river to a point where even­
tually Fort Fetterfflan was located, then atmck northwetst to 
the sources of the Powier Hver, Fro« the ̂ ôint where the 
trail left the Platte, Captain arô nn and his v«ast coluaii 
vî re sent to the Platte uridî '̂.e to help the men gtationed there 
fir't the Indians for a short tisie* They ̂ ere to travel to 
th'.? aouth slo;>L of the iJSg Horn Mountain as soon as tliey couid 
and then to the î ind itiiver Valley, where thay were to laake a 
thorough reconnoiter of that country, ©efore Joining tlife other 
ccMaauiands near Cmzy ̂ oai»n̂ s Creek , a fork of the Povd̂ r iKive#* 
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General Connor and his coiuun found it dasy gioing and 
aade an excellent road ior the p<;)lnt on the Powder 
he decided to make hî  post. He reached a point X60 ailee 
froa Fort Larasiie on August 11 which looked lik# a suitable 
locatioti and put Colonel ̂ idd In ĉ rge of a soj.dler8 
to construct the post. Connors then hurried on toward the 
rosebud 'ikiver. 
Fort Coimor, as the post iras iiamd, wisis on 1̂ ^̂  
of the Powder iiiver, aiadut four miles below the ŝ th of Hry 
Fork* It was an excellent site for a poet witla <î ly oa# draw­
back» and that was the Idck of ĥ y, Timt̂ er f̂ or tf& construci-
ion of the stockade was nearoy. The ground was ajĵ ost as 
level as a floor for sl distance of five sidles# fhis levt̂ l 
ground was on a mesa which %«a8 auout 100 feet auove the rivei*i 
and extended oack to hif̂ ' oluffs in the rear. 
Construction on the post progressed at a rapid pjce and 
in the middle of August when General î odge visited the siie 
he stated tĥ t the stockadd was finished and woric w&s well 
progressed on the cont>timetioa of the quarterawsteir's 
buildings. 
Howeveri one tbinp stood in the background that the aray 
had either ighpred or failed to take into consideration, that 
was to lead to the less of htuidreds of lives in the Powder 
River area, and the ultioiate abandonment of a xine of poi%a 
which cost the troVferniwot thousands of dollars. The for̂ , 
naaed in honor of the generai. who led t̂ he expedition to estau-
lish it, was erected on land which according to trî jaty was 
only to have a road traverse it, tmt on which no fortificationa 
or soldiers wore ever to oe placed. This fact gave the Xiuliane 
the excuse they needed to feather all of the diiâ Matisfied Indiana 
In the Northiraat under om cause--to close Che Trail 
and to prevent the erection of â  xine of fei;̂ 8 
Connox's.v cô uisii cotil̂ isiptd «q ff«tt thie ŝ -lp the post, 
and; soon hit the tcnil of a lar̂ e uiad oi Ihdt'ane heading north 
toward the Yellowstone. On the l6th, the Pawnee Bcouta found 
"m atr̂ igling '̂ irt̂ ytH-.- .giroû ,̂  and In-a runtiiAg Uattle 
kixxed the entire party of stragglers, taking 24 scalps, 24 
horses, and all the paraphemaJllA the Ii»iian# had. On Aû st 
2d, the coluoin surprised Hedicine Mails oand of Indiaris on the 
Tongue Kiver and charging into the village ̂ ust as the Indians 
were breaking caiap, drove thea froai the vixlî ii;#, 'Hie Indiana 
regrouped however, and kept up a fierfte cQUnter*̂ att;jKCk tmtil 
isidniî t, iddile the soldiers st̂ atked the buffalo rooes, furs, 
and winter* a supftxies on the lodge poles ana covers of the 
teepees in huge raounds, placed their dead on top, and fired 
the whoxe mass. 
In the Oattle over fifty of the Indians wisre killed, 
i'he entire vilxage of auout 250 lodges and all the winter's 
$• Charles j. itappler, u. s. JLaws and Statutea>i iaiasfatngton̂  
1903), p. 594. 
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supplies were destroyed, while 600 horses were captured. 
80 record is piven of the soldiers killed. 
The column continued down the Tongue the next day, to*fard 
the point of rendezvous on the Eoseuud. On Septemuer 1, the 
#Qar of a cannoii was heard aa4 pr#â i»ed to oe Xpdm Colonel 
Cole's coŝ B̂ dî  iil̂ eî dy at the resdeiivouii SQ miles to the 
north. Major Korth and sooie Pawnee Scouts wtre »ent on ahead 
to of this cttlxutai. 0ii September scouts fnxoi 
Colonel Isalker's center column reached Connor's ijroup and 
reported an attack on their column î y the Indians, supposedly 
the fasse group that Connor had routed. No news was x*eceived 
from Cole's riĵ ht column and rusaors spread throughoat the ranks 
as to their safety, êa, on the 5th, scouts returned with 
the news that there was no one at the mouth wf the Hoseoud, 
fBita for the safety of Cole's ssen were intensified. Hope 
for then was aiaost abandoned, when on the 11th, Major North 
returned fro® the Powder River w ith the report that he had 
found five to six hundred dead cavalry horses there, which 
undouotedly 4;elon{;ed to Colonel Cole *8 comssaad. 
General Connor's coluian had turned back on the 6th to 
return to good r̂aaitii? grounds, â Ki when the news of the 
serious situation of Cole's coluan arrived, Connor imaiediately 
sent a force to follow Cole's trail and furnish the® with 
relief. On the 7th, scouts located the raisuinf!: column and 
lead it to ê ort Connor as General Connor had directed thea to do. 
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OraduajLi.y» General Connor* s column worked Oack toward 
tlie fort aM vhixe caâ ped on Craay Woman's Fork# prooatotly 
waiting for Captain and his west column, Connor recoived tlie 
measaf̂ e Mhich removed hia from command of the î iatrict Of the 
Flaln», aiid ordered him to report for duty io Utah-. At; the 
9dae time that thio diaheartening neiirs arrived̂  scouts Ĵ port-
ed that the Qommkn̂  of Colonel Cole had arrived at tie C#rt 
In a deltitute i. an̂  , exhifusted condition*. 
Cê eral Coimoî  slowiy returviad tOihia pcmt on tlicf Powier 
Hiver, iurriviag ther* on Septemlier 24- Thus j the 
Hiver Indian Expedition for Ckuaeral Connor came to aQ iii# 
eitl..'"' ̂deiiex«Xî  Iia««t0ii. '#s#ipi#d contiTî l of ̂ e 
Dietrict of; ths- Plains, and Colonel Cole took chargo of the 
, .1 ' 
remainder of the Expedition on its' return to Fort i>ara«ie. 
Coloaol Cole had earned the right to take over the 
expedition, for the record of his east coxuian is one iidiî  
N 
vividly portrays ̂ he privations and hardships ifhich the 
soldiers had to struggle throu|̂  oefore the army ooî  finalxy 
estaoxieh a post in ̂ iontana. 
Colonel Nelson Cole of the 2nd Missouri Light Artijilery 
organised his column at Omaha City, IteL̂ raska Territorŷ  and 
after sufrering thc! same delays th&t Connor did, mutinies, 
and the lack of supplies, left there for ColumOus on the i>oup 
Fork of the Platte on July J,, .aê ides the already mentioned 
men of hiu comŝ and, his colimin contained 14 rifled, three* 
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fliiifa jguna for artiliery* Three eoapaities of soldlerB had to 
 ̂ioJpt in Q̂ ha to gatĥ  up st̂ raî iersî  and wait f̂ r «upipil»« 
to arrive* the stragglers caught up with the aiaio group uefore 
it reached Coiim̂ s.̂  
Ĉ iû busi the colmus mal'tî hed up the north tiranch of̂  
the ifOup Fork* It was not until they reached the head of this 
stream that they received their finai inetructlons from Coonor. 
He ĥ  pJbanned to keep everyone in the dark ae to the destin̂  
ation of the coXiffims, so as to deceive the Indiana. Honrever, 
the deceptioii worked both ways, for as litti.e was known of the 
exact geogrâ ŷ of the region they were heading toward, and 
Of confer4̂ nce of the leaders of the coliums was allowed, it 
waei oiM-y natural that conflicting ideas would:̂  ̂prevent a well 
oeolrdinated plan of attack by the columns; 
Fr̂ a the head of the north k>ranch of the i«oup, a passâ xe 
route was found alaost directly nol%h to the Hio&ritra Eiver. 
AsM̂ ei* good route was found froa here to the South Fork of 
the (̂ eireniiî  l̂ yer* , -As -iiearXs ihitte'̂ wiî  theĴ r destin*'' 
ation, this is yrikkre they hea<lled. £!o trace was found of the . 
iTOianâ  and the column wound its way north again, following 
the Morth Fork of the Cheyenxra to its' head, over to the 
Little Missourlji and west to the Powder River. 
9, '*The Powder Elver Indiwa Kxpedition," op* cit., p. 368* 
Colonel Ck»le*8 report is fr̂  page 3̂ 5 to 379» 
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'̂he route had uean passaoie to this point, but now, they 
were faced uy aliaost iiapenetraoie tiiurfs, sloping down to the 
river far aelow. At last a trail was made into the depths, 
and while the men strained oa ropes tied to the rear and sides 
of the wagons to keep theffi front overturning î to the chifl»es 
''' 
on either aide or shoving the male tea«is to t̂ eir death, the 
slow griad Zo the river bed was made. 
The point that the colurfifi hit the Powder River was ai>out 
50 miles from its ®outh, Ijamediately scouting expeditions 
were sent out searching for Connor*e column on the Tongue 
River, as supplies wer6 already running low. A few days later 
these men returned fro» seating the Tongue and Roseuud liivers 
and Panther Mountain with no results. 
Indians oegan to raid the mule herds of the colursn, and 
on Aû et 30, ran off a ounch. In the resulting running 
fight, the auies were recaptunsd, and 25 Indians kixled. Tbe 
coamand suffed quite severely also, for 4 men were killed and 
2 mortajLly wounded. Prom this tî  until the expedition left 
the country Cole*s column was continually harrassed ay Indlaia 
attacks. 
Smoke signals were seen in the direction of the leliow-
stone River, and as Cole thought that it would t>e- easier to 
get ouffaio there than to hunt for Connor's column, they 
moved in that direction, out dicaster after disaster struck 
in lightning like fashion. On the second of September a severe 
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sleet and haii storm suddenly struck, killing about 225 
horses and mules, which were in a faoiished condition fr̂  
lack of fe©d« Many of the wagons and supplies had to oe de­
stroyed, and the column turned around to laove oack up iriVer 
to »̂ ere there was ô tter framing. r 
On the 5th, eoout 1000 Indians int̂ eified the fighting 
•round the column, wut Colonel Cole axowly led his m̂ a farther 
up the river* •̂ he route taken oy Colonel l̂ alker and his 
column was found and hopf ma .ajrouaed that tbey oiight at»le 
to join his coHu«and. On the 8th, news caaoe froa Walker that 
he had met uetŵ en three and ftmr thousand warriors, and w&s 
fighting fiercely. Cole pushed on ahead to assist Walker, 
Out again nature interfered 'vith another seirere pre-w4nter 
stom during the night. Over 400 aniaals perisĥ , and again, 
wagons, harness, and supplies had to be destroyed, leaving 
the force in even more desperate straits. 
Imagine the moraJe of these men, mAio had Û en virtually 
forced to make the expedition, here in the midst of hostile 
Indian counti-y, under constant attack. They had been out 
72 days on days rations, twenty percent of v̂ ich had oeon 
lost on the way. Fatigue, and starvation haunted thea. fhSy 
had no reai. idea of where they were, nor whers they anist gjf> 
for supplies. Horse meat was their reguxat diet, and that 
axmost '.mpalataole. 
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The paly ro&mon tlie coiunft was not enfeireiy Mî stifpyed, 
was tfhst aa tbey siowly 9aoir«d up the vaiieyi the lî ta&s 
sboipci less and less inclination to fî t̂  until ĉ ly a 
few scouts followed in their wake. On the 13th, their luck 
cĥ ged, for cpiritiict was a«de with sone famealsê  ̂ of 
Connor's coiuon, who gave theia Coni«ir*s 
either Join tlb® 5'ongue, or retreat oacfc to wiieĴ e 
Fort: -Connor ĥ ':'«l>ee.n constructed.'ils>th>e'r#,,iriM»''''̂ ^̂ ^̂  ̂
ity ef BHjvl̂ nit the train Pver into the f#iiMe| pver the rugged ... 'V -J, •«. ., I " "'-I • -ifr. F C' •" ' " 4' ' T'" 
countẑ  t>eti»s(lxi the two rivet's, they continued on iip the 
PonKjer Siver with guides to lead the# to fbft Connor. The 
4râ C#d, foMspre, eâ austed coluan reaphed the fort on the 
20th, tut their troubles were not over yet, for there were 
no quarterma'st̂  stores to refit them with clothing, nor 
shoes to wear. It was not until they reached Fort iiarsiftie 
that they received new outfits. The first ten miles of the 
march to Fort Laramie, started on the 25th of September, 
was made on foot before could oe secured cto --csmry 
the men. 
If Cplonel Cole's reports are correct, he escaped frcu 
a rather precarious situation with little loss* He reported 
that he had lost twelve men killed, two salssiilig, and several 
wounded. He estimated that his comaand had killed Petmen 
two md five huî red Indians oeside the large numiber of 
faprses captured. Zn any c<melusipn, it must seem that Cole 
bad bandied hie colwan in an adodrabla manner. It is true 
that fee had not reached the rendeavous, out with as iittXe 
knowledge as the army had of the area of the Powder River, 
it is imalX wonder that his attempt failed. 
CHAPTEfi IV 
THE NIOBRAEA SURVET 
Although the Ni0br«r« Expedition uader CoXeaeX Switfer 
left ittt" at the noutK of the Niobrara Elver long ba-
fore the eolumns of the fonder River Xndiaa Expedition were 
aole to get under wayi their movenent waa ao flow, that the 
tising of the two expedStiona waa fairly w«4.1 coordinated. 
The Connor* a expeditloa preceded the Sawyer group into the 
Powder Elver country and furniahed them with eaough support 
so that they eould auecesafully complete the m̂ ey through 
the hostile Xndiaa country to reach VirglMa City. 
The purpose of the Nlobrarii Hlver survey, authorised 
by an act of Congress» March 3, 1665> was to survey and lay 
out a road frooi the mouth of the Hlobrara Elver in Neoraska 
Territory, to Virginia City ia Montana Territoxy. k branch 
road from Qmsha una to iatersect the other road at aome 
point on the Niobrara* In connection with the proposed 
Niobrara road, another route was to be surveyed frMi the 
mouth of the Big Cheyenne River, west to the Powder Hlver, 
there to connect with the Niobrara to Virginia City road* 
However, the surveying expedition for this line only went 
as far west as the forks of the Big Cheyenne where they 
turned back due to lack of military protection, and begâ  
sunreying the edstern end of the road froa the aouth of the 
Big Cheyenne to the Minnesota oorder**̂  
The Niobrara expedition under Colonel JaMss A* Sawyer 
was beset by delays due to lack of supplies sjid suitable 
aiilitary escort, and did not;, get away trm its omm at 
Miobrara City until June 13• Colonel Sawyer had asked for 
as es6ort of 200 cavalry with six nonths rations, and Iraa 
highly displeased to receive only two ctmpanles of the fth . , 
U. S, Volunteer Infantry (iia,>»») fflonths rations. 
His next request to headquarters brouf̂ t 25 uen of CcAlim̂  
Ist Battalion, Dakota Cavalry, with additional rAtiofts 
to bring the total for the rations up to the six months 
odniffiua desired. With this escort and rations, Colonel 
Sawyer decided to attempt the survey.̂  
The expedition proper consisted of 53 men, including 
an engineer and clerk, a physician, guides, pioneers, scouts, 
herders and drivers, with 45 yoke of oxen, 5 sAddu.e horses, 
5 siules, and 15 wagons with equipment and supplies for six 
au>nths. The esoort consisted of the 143 acB already viinitioned, 
and 25 wagons drawn by 6-Kule teaas. Also, aecospanying the 
1. "Wagon Road from Niobrara to Virginia City," g£. Cit.. p. 2. 
2. The story of Xihe Ifiobrara survey has been taken from 
Colonel Sawyers official report to Secretary of Interior 
James Harlan, urtiich is document 5̂  ia: House Exe<̂ tiVe 
Documents, first Session, 39 Congress, Vol. i, pp. 11«21$. 
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•atpoditlidR were 5 eaigraat trains and a private fraight 
of wagons ̂ p̂led together ao aa to be drewn by Id tei»e 
of 6 yoke eicen Mieh. To prove the practicaiaility of the xi»ute 
whioh he followed; Sawyer pointed out on hie jneturn that not 
oiiee on Virginia .City did, this~ 
be'itileeupled for'/paasage of any obataele jik*rottte;v 
"iV'tms evliiM'f̂ im t% ..etiH that the e«fî  wo«iid"he. 
inauffielent for the Journey beoauee of the apeeiai tĴ ivel 
pinna'for tlbe'0c|>edition*v To<'aa'f%'#ut ,a .|>̂ ln trail, all̂ :. 
of the wagons were arranged In a single file* and were to 
forllow that plan ajimoet all ef the way, mkiag istiem partlo** 
ularly vulnerable to Indim attack. Many of the emigrants 
realiised this, and soon turned back, acecMspanied by several 
herders ai»S drivers, who also deserted. However, to WAke the 
best of the situation, Colo«»l Sawyer split his eseort Into 
platoons and InterspezHred thea at regular intervals throuî -
out the trains. This way they provided a mlniauBi of proteot-
ion te all parts of the ooIubub. General Sully had provided 
forty extra amy Springfield rifle# when he had sent the final 
25 cavalry, and these were distributed among the elvlll«i#, 
ndtiioh added considerably more proteetlon for the train. 
The rmte was mlm/ly marked out up the South Cheyfsaie 
ftiver and across to the Korth Cheyenne, then northwest in 
the direction of the Powder Elver, with aKlnor Improvemeatn 
such as grading down to a ford or thr̂ î  a deep ravine, ̂ 
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er bridgiiif m belag mmcLe ma they wovedt iileag* l4̂ ttle 
ot̂ urred to dtoturb tb« sovenont of the expHî lieo ufttt4> 
20, Miien they epproaohed the South Cheyeaoe Bivec' «sila* At 
this point, Csptfldn WiXliford, î o wma In charî  of the esoort, 
deeided that hie laea woitld need qusrtenMster supplies )»efot« 
the miTvay was conoltided, sad decided to sead a detaii to Fort 
Larsade for these sapplies* A wagoa wss fitted out with î x 
»f the best aiules to pull it, aad with the If sea as eseort 
Lieuteasat Oaaa left for Fort Lars£B|e* So that the wagoa deat 
to Larsfliie eould flod the expeditioa oa its - retura, CoIobmiI 
decided to aove very slowly ap ithe South Cheyeaae uatil 
they returaed. Bowever  ̂ oa August 1, Juieuteaaat Dssui aad his 
sMta returned with ao supplies. They had eaoouatered a detaoh-
Boat of soldiers stoviag trtm i4uraffile to joia Qeaeral Coanor 
oa the Powder ftiveir aad retunuid with thea, leaviiig the wagoa 
to e<mtiQue oa tram Fort Laraaie aleae. This aMossltated 
another delay, for eavalxy had to be seaft out looldag for the 
wagoa. The aavali7 returaed oa Aufuat 9 with ao aewi of the 
wsgoa, so Sangrer eoaoluded it had retitraed to Laraaie. Two 
uNHiks at least wore wasted with no results la tryiag to seeure 
the suppliss. 
The expedition had osaped aear Fuapkin Butte i^ile wait-
lag for the cavalry to discover the wagon, and Sawyer had sent 
out scouting paii;>ies along the aorth side of the butte to see 
if a passable road could be worked ^t to the Fiywder River oa 
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Hide of the hills« The ooouts returtMd aixi rejport  ̂ that 
.there, iree little.̂  wood no# itktmr on 'th«t rcwte*'' -iQiiULe'i^y:' 
iwre ret.ttrmiflc» Indieae had staddemly etruoli; «t their faji{ii one 
niglit, killing one of the eoldiera imd etealing mmm of tho 
etoek,̂  
The exp«dition.;inoired along the ..imth aide of.:Fiua|i»lcin'' 
wvi%%mg on thO' l^th of' Anpnat it'- vaa  ̂also attaok^: tuf iNKtween 
5 C K > ' a n d  6 0 0 .  I n d i a n a "  A n d  f o r c e d  t o  < e o i T i i l %  - F o r  t h r e e ^ ' t i N i  .  
IiMliitee oontinifetd the fi|̂ tt Mt aa thef aocoapliilied little  ̂
t^e noon of the ISllii  ̂they oaae up Md asked for a parley# 
Ceioiwl Saiqrer waS' q^te idMii^"-to  ̂oblige* and' aJ^erf^^~»ent«>  ̂
ing; -the Indians, .idth' a 'large iimiiher' of g|fts.» 'icMi; allied to^:\/ 
p^oeed* *^10 Indiana proved to he a hax  ̂ of Cluiyennto^aiid 
Sioux. Diiur^ng tl  ̂pimoe negobiatioas* tw sbldiex  ̂wer» 
killed as thi  ̂triad to barter wit  ̂ a grdiip of the Ij^ans* 
The next day the expedition eontinued toward the north-
nmsta r^iEowever, m tibe. 17th, i^e esoort.̂  reftssed to pro#s0'' 
an^' fai%her» ad %0l.|̂ ed'.̂ ^%o.j]fettiym to laraaie. a gtmp 
seottts, iribioh the eaYSlry refused to aoeeiBpaayi, was sent 
toward t^M- to' s«e ..'if"-t^fyr^ould find trsoe 
of Oe^Heral Coanor*s coluasn* On the 19th» they returned with 
't|in"e'ii4Mfs tbaf';;|1iiy.v^h#d.;:foiiad a good ipiidst  ̂̂ foiid .̂̂ i^3rerf 'iaAd 
1^at-;0n thO'^Pi^' 4Mr;''thd& ri#erll^«y  ̂haA; l^iidiid ~'^e two day 
Old t  ̂ of (ktneral $oknor* 
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l&th thia Qewa, the eseort decided to contiaue, aî  ̂ e 
e3Cjpedi%i#B aeoa reached the Otr Ferk, where Captala VlXliferd 
and his eSNeort agaia decided that they would aot predeed 
farther* Sâ er was forced to send out aaother seeutlBg eaĉ  
jpfditlftt* tiiie uî er CoXoias| Qedfrey* 13 
. 'Bel9il''%lieir ââ  t<h%y../f»tiffid' Co«iisr| aad, rslated,:to 0eli»iiel..., 
Kidd the expeditions difficulties* Colonel Eidd ofdsî d 
"Ĉ |4al# l̂ llf̂ d' artS F®r̂  .f#r dttty#-
ai»i detailed aA.., eS«brt ̂ to aeconpaety Csloiiel CNô r̂ey m #iNM̂ h. 
of Qoweior for f̂ rt̂ er orders* 
The sunreying expeditloa î ed up to Fort Connor assi ll̂  
itt wait for aews fron Conxtor. lews arrived on AiigaiM̂  25# î siii 
ColoAsi Qodfrey returiled with instructions for Captain tfillî  
ford and his infantry ̂ 9 rweain at Fort Ccnnor. Colonel kidd 
was ordered to furnish 3aiorer with a cavalry escort ti» acreesK-
pany hi« to the Big Hum &iffir» 
The surveyinc; expedition again noved slowly toward 
Virginia City, this tine stfidî t through hostile Indian 
emmtrfrn They followed the path of Connor's ooliaaaBi to Crasy 
Wo«an*s Fork, and to t.he Clear Fork. On the 29th, l̂ e selunn 
passed Father SsSniliRi -Udce, mad Moved across Piney Fork to a 
branch of the Tongue* On the 31stwhen they reached the 
siiddle hraneh of the Tongue, Indi«pf struck at the expedition. 
Captain Cole was killed while scouting ahead of the wagon 
train* On Sept«nber 1, the ooltwn atteapted to cross the 
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north Wmmh of the Tongue, and ̂ watms of iBdlazia engulfed 
t% wae half .way acro«e«. TwO' iMa 'Were ..killed 
a&d: ''aoiil«<herae« lo.»t.» 
0« the theiie Xî iaiie ipproaehed, this tiae to talk 
ever peace terms* ttiey wire Arrapahoe, and iNusted to recoirer 
their horsey from Ckjieral Goaner, mlko had attaM thea four  ̂
dî fe before and takeji aost of their ĥ iee* ladiaas* 
prop̂ iial to oontaot C#mor, in as attempt to r̂ eeover their 
horaea, fitted Sawyer's imippoiw admirably, for he desperately 
fdshed to seottre liore assistiAfire tv&m Coiuaor. Oenseqfaeatlyi 
thrie soldiers three Indians were sexit off in the direct* 
lea of (Seaeral crelins* On Sspt«sber 4» ths three 
XwUfĤ u retoraed, sad reported that aany ŵ ite aen were oa 
the way* On Septeaber 5i early in the aoming. Captain 
Ktll̂ g and Z$. mm î ode into eaap. They had oeen sent to 
C«Bnor's tdlvmn with aail and on the way back had been attseked 
ladiaas» aittl had" n̂ t dared rstujra to Fort Ooinor* 
the aea ia the expedition decided net to continue on 
without fiŷ rtliMHr escort* as ths ones they had eeald enly travel 
to the Big Heftt IM̂ ver with thr«s* *̂ 0 expedition waited until 
the 13th for assistance froa Oennor, and Sawyer reluct-
tMuitlf hack toward fSiî  Conner* On mrrivmi at their 
the nlgtit ê f the 13th» the support sent b̂ y Ceaaor eaujĝ t 
up with ̂ heit coaposed ef Coaq̂ any L, 2ad California 
Cavalî y And a of %dlsii scouts wader Captain A« brown. 
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The troefft uiKi«ir Sftiqrer returned to Fort Coonori «» 
'̂ eirv̂ fii...o ftê ioe wti« "ioMarly mxptr$4g. aod the e.xpeditioa 
heMe# treat Hgftls meromw. the north brwseh of the Tongue* 
T̂ 3r''«re«.#id the- l<lttXe Rors' Kdliere the eeeort, exoept for d 
«en retttfiied' to Fort Gomor» 
Cm %h0 2JL«t,r ooiitimied oui hitting Pryore Fork, 
and o» |>he 22iui» the telXewstoite * The ooXwaa noved up 
rii«r :mlXmf lAiere- they o«B̂ pe4' -ism Rooky Fî .̂  Om the 
..'̂ ?th|.:;.|̂ eŷ oroefted the eeiit fork of the-;;':ftofiebud- Eiver, then, 
the aid̂ e fork, md Koted b««tk to the Yeiieirfttone* While 
'iSMilur''«̂ e 'lelXowetî  theyhetifeen./400< 500 wiekiftKw ̂ ' 
boetft ef aen dad fur# fleeting dewii the riirer on the wfty haek 
to-' the:̂ ite«« 
file (Ĉ oliiau coatiiuMtd up the leXlMretone, after eroeeing 
to thf; and noved into the iBountftlnft nAiere a f̂ eJUfte 
Xead t<  ̂ aatray* On lUie fteooad atteapt, on Septeieiier  ̂
t' 
t̂ ey -over "into the (Î Xitin faXXey/,cont£itmed"̂ n 
that ir#i.Xeyi"- flaiXXir'" reached- their de:8tiaatle9gN—fi.T9lĵ  "' 
City. 
il4 Virgiaia City, ̂ î er de<rid<Kl that the aeaeoa Has toei 
far adtanê  to return OTer the route to etraî tea out the 
roadt the aide route to Guahe. He offered the 
for aaXe and aade a qulok return trip to Sî iac City* 
The fotHy rifXei Xent the expedition hy the aray wer̂  turned 
over-'to QecuiraX̂ iieagher. 
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Cel«it#X Sawyor reported that he knew that the fiiojorax̂  
Gitŷ Tlrgiala City read, which he had made the preXiitdiiary 
aunrey# for« eouid i9e ehorteniKla£̂  shouî cf be ahorteaed • He 
redowiieikLed tiiilS) en additidoai #2̂ ,000 £>e appropriated for 
. v •• 
tteamed up.hie .report with ̂ thia.. itatea^t'i. 
The Ippertaaoe of having thia route aore fully de-
veX4»p̂ ' kept, open for travel, oy 'protection-.aipifiat 
thiT Indian e'm- haxnily be overeatinated. It ia at leaat 
600 4«ilet ib»AVNir than the iroiite hitherto iMten trnveled 
ti(y\aui|iy '::«;¥.«.'iv.̂  ̂ wc»od|.. waterv î d graiia» in altttiidpa«#»;~ -
and nn iMwâ aisi ranges of importanee to croaa, and upon 
thef' wholo-"'n'.,,.Mr»t.claafi route ̂to truvei over, if the--
'f*ĉ te->ta protNt̂ ited agaioet I.ndiana, and eons ĵ laeea 
on it x̂ looatld aM narked in a more thoroû  aianner, 
all travail to î atana aad Idaho xust aê eaaarily Miiia 
over it| ̂aa'by lt-'«uoh'tine and travel oioA he invid.« 
fhif rovte lf̂ vnuf̂  better than an eî al numuer of nllee 
oil t̂ e went nbd any of the routes hitherto traveled 
and no alkaline water worth enticing was seen on the 
wfei'iln Tmtm » ' • 
The Niobrara survey shoŵ  the army that there was a 
shorter route into Montana and Idaho than the routes which 
had been usetf to iieat and to the north* However, the w<̂  
of Colonel 3aî |>r/on first part of hie exĵ ditioh was puH 
to no use. The next; year the amy decided that the line ̂ f 
eeigration would move along a route narked out by John Bose-
man whl̂  had easy accosts to the Oragbn Trail. k̂fn«iral 
Sheman reccMMMdnded that tht proposed road froa Kioprara City 
;v 4.._ 
to the Potirder River be aoandoned, and tĥ  aii&y focused its 
attention on what Ĥ e to be known as the iî ozeman Trail. 
CHAPTER V 
TĤ  BOZEKAH TRAIL AHi) FORT C, F. SHlfH 
Haviî  c<Mpieted the oMipplng of the Hlebrax*a route into 
Hoiitana.; iii':.JL#45f'..the amy aaide pxa8a>lî ~'the 
next year to copplete the route via the Pivifdier River* €k»jeMraX 
Pop#, in eoiiiaand of the Departiwttt #f̂ .t̂  wliiiSh lii* 
eluded meat of- t̂ « ̂ orthitê , peiat̂ " #ut̂ tl̂ at̂ 'people,  ̂
iBeredlole aun̂ rs continued to throng the QrelEt JPialiui 
to the rich aiining regions in Montmaa Idaho. Undeterrî  
c»y tito hards&ips aiid privatioiis they encountered ̂ taey 
mk Not only did these ead̂ grants and fretî ters travel during 
the suaaier oonthŝ  tmt also during tiNe winter. In their wake 
they left frdaea aaiffials and abuodom̂  wagons, snow piled high 
about theiiy while post hospitals along ths route were filled 
2 with frost bitten toiuasters and emigrants* 
Travel by wiatir was made neefssary because i>f the large 
population of ̂ o mlaing regions, and because of a la€̂  of 
transportation facilities to build up food reservos. Only 
JL. Lieutenant General W-, T* Sheman, *fleport oiy ̂ port of 
Ms. Sffsmtry &£ laSt {Washington, iMfJl I, p, 21. 
2* Major General John Pope, "Report of the 9i04idltiOBi aî  
Heeessities of the Departmtiit̂ of the IlissouHL,** a<̂ «e 
f'irst Session, mh 
Congress; Vol. 12, l6o6, (Washioftoa, 1866), p. 3. 
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enough food was received durl ig the susuner months to maintain 
the people for short periods of time« and unleas goods con­
tinued to arrive throughout the winter months, they would have 
3 starved. 
Pope further pointed out that there were three routes into 
the iiinlng regions which the aray aust of necessity keep open. 
Ĥ iiever, as it did not have the necessary men to keep all three 
open« the army must consider them as one, and keep the worst 
bottleneck, the route through the Powder River area, secure. 
Easy connections could be made oy this route to all three other 
roads, which were almost entirely safe from Indian attack most 
4 
of their length. 
To further prove the necessity of keeping the Boseman 
Trail open, Pope pointed out the lack of dependence anyone 
could place on traffic up the Missouri Eiver. At any time 
duriiâ  the season navigation might fail due to low water. 
Xa conclusion, Pope said; In connection with the Mis-
»mri River therefore, it is essential that ther̂  should be 
•ooe safe and sure means of transportation by overland route 
it 
mich cannot fail under any circumstancee.**"̂  
4* Ibid.. p. 4* Thtse three routes included two routes 
if»i»3Sira the 
5 • I bjld# 9 p • 5 • 
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With this conclusion, tha army began plaiming for the 
 ̂ 6 
eomplotion of the forts along the Bosenaii Tralli 
begun in 1865* with the erection of Fort Connor by General 
Connor* 
A Mountain District in the Department of the Platte was 
organized especially to cover the route trom Fort Connor west* 
ward to Virginia City via the Big Horn and Yellowŝ  
In charge of the Koimtain District | on Aftril 13# 1S66, was 
7 placed Colonel Henry B. Carrington* 
Colonel Carrington was then in Otmiand of the East Sub* 
district of Kebraska, with headquarters at Fort Kearney. As 
he hsd only about 22C men in his eoBaaan̂ * he was forced to 
wait until recruits filled out his cosipliatent of troops be­
fore leaving. General Shenton arrived at Fort Kearney during 
this time,, and final plans were made for the cospletion of 
the line of posts into Montana. On May 19, the recruits 
arrived and the aarch was begun toward their destination, 
a 
Fort Connor, 
6. Hebard and Brininstool, The iioaeaan Trail. (ClevelaiKit 
1922), Vol. I, pp. 214-220. This roaa was n̂ aussied after 
John M. Boseman, ndlio in the winter of l862«>ld63, left 
Bannack with John N« Jacobs to find a shorter route 
lato the gold fields of Montana throuĵ  the Yellowstone 
Valley and the Powder River country. 
7. Secretary of Interior, Juetter of, Senate Executive ̂ sSr 
rnssm* 3>. First Session, JOtfî SSgrSSS; isi®, 
{̂ ashinptbn, 18dd), Vol. I, p. 2, 
d. Ibĵ d.. p. 3* 
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The original orders irom Readquarterst of the 
Missouri, issued t̂ roh 10, 1666, called for the 39#ond Battal* 
ion of the lith i. S, Infantry to constitute the giurrl8i«a of 
Fî j% ̂ no (Foî t Ĉ tmnor tra® to bit ahaodoned, aovê  40 alles 
west, and rensm&d Fort Eeno) on the PonKier EiVer, and th« ti#o 
'nê " ||6fti|.- qli.̂ 'thl vraule City* 
The first, of th#' pe'fts 'was t̂  be"' jptlacfd< nft̂ r -tlie. haiii''-if' 
the Big flom Hountainŝ  and the second on, or 
n 
Yellowstone River#' 
However, a folloiiring general order froai the 
Kansas and the Territories, called for two eoffiĵ aĵ fs of the 
l8th Infantry to relieve the garrison at Fort Cohn̂ » Four 
ocmpanies of the »tim& outfit imre to estahXifh c new post on, 
or near, the Piney Fork of the Clear Fl>rk of the Powder HIver, 
to be known as Fort î no# The other two eoaipanies were te 
establish a new post #t the croseing of the Big Horn River at, 
or near, the aiouth of Rotten Qi'aes Creeic, to be el̂ ed Fort 
Ransbn#'̂  ̂ . 
Still further changes were iuMte t̂ n the dx̂ rs were 
issued froB the Mountain ill strict Headctaarters coi June 28« 
The plans called for Fort Connor te be twiiporarily garrisoned 
by a detaohaent of 30 ven fron Coapany B, Idth Xî antrŷ t tmder 
Ihid.> p» |l« General Order Bo» 13» 
lOi Ibid*, p. General Order 8o. Î «r 
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Colonel t. S. Kirtland* Fort Eexio was to be garrisoned by four 
eoKpa&ies nader Captaiia t. Ten Eyek, Fort Sanseai mis to be 
giarrisoBed bjr two ooapanles under Brevet Lieutenant Ooloxiel 
Cv Kinneŷ  upper Yellowstone post was to be garrisoned 
by two c<̂ patiies under Brevet Mailer Henri" Haymond*̂  
The fiual orders» which irore issued trm the Head« 
quartersI Bistriot of the Platte, and which were the ones put 
into efJTeott «rare also different, two companies of the l̂ th 
Infantry were to garrison Fort Connor* Four o<mpaMes were 
to establish a post about SO miles north of Fort C«Haâ r on the 
new rcmte to Virginia City, and on the waters of either the 
Powder or Rosebud River, to be known as Fort Phil Kearney* 
The two renaining ccmpanies were to establish a post at the 
crossing of the Big Rom Hiver on the saoe road, and about 
70 Miles beyond Fort Phil Kearney, to be known as Fort C« 
Smith 
Behind this last change in plans for the erection of the 
iine of forts lay the reasoning of Colonel Cazringtoii* 
Althouî  he had marched from Fort Kearney with his coiiî leo 
ment of recruits filled, he still considered that he had too 
few men to attempt to establish all the new pests desired by 
higher headquarters. He decided to use Fort Connor as a base 
Ibid., p. 54. General Order Ko# 2, 
12. ih-fri.M p. 55. General (̂ er Mo# 7-
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for his ŝ VGzioe along routs to s8tat>lish ths other posts# 
the garrlsondos of Fort Coanor Mds it aecessary for hlA to 
give up all plaas to estalaliî  the post on the upper fellow-
13 
stooot as he was already short of boq* 
Colonel Carrlngton and his isen »oved northwest froei Fort 
Kearney, and airived near Fort Laramie on June 14* A peaoe 
e&wimtl was in session to secure the opening> by treaty, of 
the iwte of the Boswaan Trail. Special orders were issued 
to keep the soldiere from causing friction with the Indians 
lit 
wlio were in attendance at the council* Out tremble develop­
ed in Spite of the precautions* Colonel Carrî toh was 
itstrodiiced to the chief tans as "the Iftiite Chief 4P»ing up to 
eooupy the Powder River, the Big Horn country, and the XelXeŵ  
stone.Standing Elk, a chief of the Brule Siê , iraediat* 
sly inforaied Carrington tĥ it the Sioux mre net all in attendauoice 
at the council, and that the Sioux not present trould not give 
up to tlMf road without a fight*̂  ̂ ''̂ t is possible that the 
ttarch of Carrington* s aen into the Powder River cmmtry in the 
Bidet of the peace council played a part in preventing its-
miccess, but it is also probaole that such chiefs as Red Cloud 
3̂* Ibid., p. 11* 
14* Xbid.m p* 4. 
15« iMd.. p. 6. 
Xbid.. p. 5. 
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wotild not hâ e epnaNBtiited to the road*a being opened on aaf 
conaideration« The app«aran«e of the aoldiera nerely gave 
then a ̂q><^ ;'<si^9ev:t.fthe 'aouaeli. 
As Carrington bad no authority to wait to hear the reaulta 
of thi p'tAX̂ ' l:ĉ aĉ 4» .h# a»de ;pref»â aĝ ion|,:t«'i moire on to fort. 
Cotuier*^ His'"«o«i&aad' wat^'ahert at ib£is^tB'''sb4 »m» ^t wsta"' 
to be filled out later as he expanded froll flcirt Comijor* Aa 
m emvmlry was aaalgned to hiia, he hn^ rn&mped 
fantxy at Fort Kearney until eftvalxir crould be sent* His 
supply of food and aaBunltlbn was alao »«41y laeking. Only 
1(X)0 rounds of ammnitioa eould be fouKid at ̂ arapde f<q»r thii 
0.14 fashioned ,5̂  ealibar gumBg and only four days 
of stale bread could be secured* fo make aatttrs wsrâ :» ab 
utensils could be ebtainsd to bake their onm brma<i« Smf9Wtuc, 
Carrington felt that hs eould gat assistance froa an infantry 
pest î ish was to be built at the feet of the Black Eills not 
far frcm his destination, and he Ksvsd northwest to f̂ art 
Co&nor* The plsns for tlis post in the Black Hills iisî  sban** 
doned and Colonel Carrington was left to his own deiriees in 
solving the situation in which he fooiKl himself 
On Jum 2$f the group under Carrington aî ved at Fort 
Conii0r, ihsreafter referr#d to as Fort fteno as it was Fmtâ di 
17* p* 6* 
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by Carrington}̂  ̂and ralieved the twe ofmpaaie# of the 5th U. ,S. 
ToXunteer XnfaiitZT: idi<i h«d been left there the year tiefore by 
Qener&X Coim<»r« The Indiana did net wait long to tMtgiii the 
attack that waa to harrasa Colonel Carrijogtoii and his aen ttatil 
the line of forta was abandoned• The day after the eosmaad 
arrived at Fort Reno, the Indiana atole the atoek of the mitler 
of the post. The aieo sent in pursuit returned with only a 
»quaw*s pony which waa loaded with a few dreaaea and other 
f̂ inlne articles#̂  ̂
Carrington fouad a gtaup of enlgranta» in a highly dia* 
organised and reatlesa condition, cimped near the poat, 
awaitiuK escort* Que of his first duties wma to issue a 
general order regulating their conduct, and others to follew 
thea, in passing over the Boseaan Trail* All groupa traveling 
over the route had to report at each post along the way* lid 
group wil̂  less than 30 arved TOn could proceed along tlw 
trail beyond Fort Eeno. Ho one waa to aplit fr<»i his party 
between posts, nor could anyone trade with Indians along the 
ld« Fort Reno was named in honor of General Jesse Reno, 
a hero ef the Civil War, killed m September 14, 1̂ 62, 
during an act of bravery at the battla of South Mountain, 
Maryland* 
19* Secretary of the interior, 90. cit*> p, 7* 
0̂* Ibid*> p» 7* General Order Ko* 4* 
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Hie aext Job of Oarringtoa was to pick the spot abô t 
do. Miles farther north along the trail î iere the next post 
was to be bttilt* His guides, «li» Bridger and Brannan, told 
hiH that they knew of a good site on Tongue Riveî  ̂Sô  send­
ing att appeal back to headlquarters for iiH»r« nen̂  Carringtbn 
jttoired north* On July I3, he oamped near the Piney Fork of 
the Clear fork of the Powder River, aâ  explored the country 
for siiles arouâ  in search of an appropriate site for « post, 
lifhile easped here, he reeeived a message from « group of 
CheyenaNB Iiuiian chiefs, asking if the itiites wanted peace or 
WKtm Carrington returned a cordial invitation asking the 
Cheyennes to cone in and hold council with hiia soon* 
On July 15, the site for the new post, fort Phil Kearney,22 
was surveyed and occupied on the eaiap site of the 13th, and 
preparations were Bade to begin construction, fhe next day. 
Black Rorse and other MMbers of the CheyeiMMî tBane into oaaqp 
for a conferance and effered to furnish 100 sen to fî t the 
Sioux with the soldiers If Carrington had been able to 
accept this effer« the outeoam of his work along the Bosesan 
Trail fflight have been different* iiut he could not, and the 
Ch.y«"°* 
21* X.bid *, p« d* 
22* Named in honor of General Philip Keamy, hero of the Mex* 
lean and Civil Var, killed at Chantilly, Septesiber 1, 
1̂ 2. Either,Keâ y or Keâ ey is correct for the Port. 
23. Secretary of the Interior, o£. cit.. p. 9. 
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With the extcHtttion of the line of forts to Fhll 
%he opposition of the Indians increased in intensity* EUiwiV 
ous attacks were made on supply and emigrant trains ̂ Hitwesn 
Fort Eeno and Phil Kearney, aî  in soae instances on irell 
armed eoluoiis moving along the route4̂  ̂
After tiie estat̂ lishMnt of Fort Phil Kearney, Oarrington 
began â ing plans for extending his line of forts into the 
Big Rom Valley* His d̂ maaAm for assistance to cax̂  on his 
work gained little iNseogaitioitt frcm Headquarters» Blstri«t of 
the Platte I and they left it up to his desoretion to estai;}liidii 
the Big Horn post.̂  ̂ Carrington felt that to refuse to ad̂  
•ance to tlM Big Horn was to surrender the pulrpese of the 
entire aoveiaent, as the fort he had established, Phil Kearney, 
could furnish no protection to trairel through the t&ngA& Hirer 
country, or west to Virginia City* As there was a large force 
of miners froa Virginia City working in the aouatains near the 
proposed site, he felt th&l̂  they would furnish able assistance 
in the fight against the Indians* Carrington also fellt that 
as this fort would ue near the western limit of the best hunt­
ing grounds, it would cover the outgoing trains and escorts, 
and put hin in a more ready possession of facts pertaining to 
24« Ibid., p* 10* Lieutenant-̂ Qenersl Shersuua, "Report of," 
^̂ |SS$:aSiSIX &£, IhE* (Washington, 
25* Secretary of Interior, OP. eit*. p* 17* 
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tlie etmatrf aboVe 4̂  iieyond* In the last analysiŝ  he i4ahed 
to ooQviate the Indians that this was no teaqporary expedition̂  
but a 8ab«t«ati&l, fixed occupation 
On August 3t Meutenant Colonel N« C« Einnsy with 
two coapanies of Infaat*? left Fort Phil Kearney to establish 
the first ar«y post in Kontana, Port C, F, Smith With the« 
they carried 300 tons of hay and a year*s supply of pr̂ rislons# 
On August 12f the two eoApanles arrived at the site chesen for 
the new post<*«a bluff overlooking the Big Horn Eiver, a few 
niles above the present sî e of St. Xavier, Montana«»ai3d began 
the construction of the post.̂ ® 
Civilian labor was hired in constructing the post î ch 
was partially swde of adobe or sun dried brick*̂  ̂ On August 
29t CarringtoB reiKirted that the post was well established, 
and if he had five sM̂ r̂  eoopanles of infantry available be 
would {Rit w&Wdepets at varLims Intervals betwBea the three 
postsy and on the Tellow8tone» to further protect the route. 
However, General Cooke felt that the protectlbn had already 
been extended too far, and authorised the withdrawl of the 
Ihid.» p. 16. 
27* Naned in honor of OeneraX Charles Ferguson ̂ itĥ  who iMiS 
given three brevets for distinguished service during the 
Mexican War. Saiith died on April 25« 1̂ 62. 
28, Hebard and Brlnlnatool, The Moieoiaa Trail* (Cleveland, 
1922), fol. II, p. 135. 
29. Ibid.» p. 135. 
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BEieQ rro» Fort C, F, Smith Colonel Carrington protestod 
this decision, for it «fould aesiii the destruetion of a great 
deal of ,M9rk»;, the abandonaient of «ueh of the hay and nupplies 
that had t»«eB taken to the neir post, besides rmmwing fron 
the western end of the route the p̂ oteotion î oh he so strongs 
ly belieyed was' aeoessa'ry'# If it had not for t̂ :e support', 
given Cjm*inftdn by General Basen,̂  ̂who was oĥ ân inspeotion 
t&ar In tlMi region at the tiae, it is proiaâ e that Foî  G. F. 
Swlth would have b«en abandoned before it nctuslly been 
e(Mpleted« 
Carrî ton won in his fi|̂ t to maintain the fort, and 
eonstructioB of the post eontinaed* By Koveatafor 14 > the work 
on the defense of the fort WAS coiapleted, awi progress was 
well oa the way to completion of «|aarters for the soldiers*̂  ̂
The post was situated in a very strategic position ever<-
looking the crossing of the Big Horn Eiver tty the Boatman 
trail. the stockade, look̂ ts could see anyone irtto 
approached within three atiles of the fort* Oasufi was â xnd̂ Eit 
in the area, a nd froa tJie top of the s'lioeksd# oould be seen 
toffaloi*' ellc,'''-aiiit«lope, axM 'berâ Ĵ ;* ,"̂ #11 gaae aod 
30* Secretary of Interior, i2£. cit4> p# 17• 
3 l 4 r ' a n d  H a s e n ^  " I n s p e c t i o n  ' b y » * *  
32• Secwtarŷ  of IntStHor, asa# cit.. p. 35» 
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fruit #er« plentiful, while th« 8tr««ai8 wer« alive with trout. 
Food «#«Med a nioor probliiiii, yat tha garriacm livid on cons 
moat of oaa wintar because tha post was in a stata of aiaga 
by the Indiana*̂  ̂
Tha stockade of the fort wfis 125 yards s<|yiara« with the 
«Mst and south side constructad of adeha* and the aaat aik 
north side (the north sida faead t̂ e rivar) nada of uĵ rlfht 
lags. Part of tha ŝ  ̂wall MAS formed 0y the CMUtar walls 
of three sets of soldiers'barracks* Betwean thaS4» #hraa har* 
racks two driveways antered tha stockada* At the aaut̂ aaat 
comer of tha araa was a iMilddar towar tdblish aervad as a 
out and a guard hauaâ  Tha cstttral sto«(k«da 
sarrid as a parade and drill gẑ und, Haar the ndî h sid# 
stood threa sets of officers quarterajl with the flag pola di<». 
raotly in front of the aAddle dwia* Two mora offlcare* quarters 
sat near the wast wall, tdbiile near the eaat wall of tha stock* 
ade sat an office ouildlng, a atorehouse, and a quartarmastar 
building* 
Outside the stoakada to the north, betwesn the fort and 
the river, waa constructed a aafe mill, the taî tera* and 
eaployfis* log cabins, and the stable and aurral. To tha east 
33* Hebard and iirininstool, cit«. Vol. II, p. 134» 
34# TrObpa IJear Port Phil Kaarnay,* Kouae Exec-
ytiva poajtia» 71, Second Session, 39tEuô ress# 
18̂ 7# (ws'snlngton, 166?) # Vol. 11» p* 9» 
m 
to Uie stockade itat the stttXer*a atox*e. On the aorth 
aiid west side of the waJLXa were placed rifle pita* Juat out*' 
aide affiall gates leading to them. The lioseffiem frail ran paat 
the «ieat aide to Virginia City, 2̂ 1 adlea away« and to Port 
;Ptd.l Kaaraey.., .$1 ai-lea-̂ away., placing the fort la''an̂ âliiiOiSt . 
Isolated poaltldn*̂  ̂ It waa lapoaalble to naintiila eoii«iHaiii<-
cation over the 91 eilea to Phil KeanMy through the lioaxit of 
the hostile Iikdiana* ea«ping and hunting groianda* 
winter no word was received from the poat̂  it «rali thouî t 
to have tmen destroyed*̂  ̂
Only a Bonth after the aoldiers arrived at the fort the 
first casualty fron Indian attack occurred lAien Chdurles |k>iMiaQ» 
a civilian eaqployee, was killed near the poat* Six diy« lator» 
two soldiers were killed just outside the fort*̂  ̂ Suî ly 
trains between t ha fort «nd Phil Kearney were also under eon* 
tinual attaek* and nuiMrms instances of heroian were xweorded»̂  ̂
Very little information can t>e found aoout the activity of the 
35* %l»al*d and Brininatool, ô . cijfr., Vol, XI, pp. 135» 
36* "Masaacre of troops Near Fort ?hil Kearney," cit.. 
p. 9* 
37* 0r* Tho»as *»• Marquis, •'Fort C. F. %ith." Bockv Maun* 
' Huahandaan̂  fioveiiM)»r l6,i 1̂ 33* 
3̂ 4 Hebaxid and Brininstool, w. cit«. XI, p. 137, fhla 
i@ the stoir̂  of Î riseolX̂ and the oi.ind anile that escaped 
trm a mttt̂ inded wagoA train between Keamey and 3«lth, 
and rode through the night to 38dLth Tor help* 
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fort. One weil kzk̂ n atory, however, 1b the aetioa *>i>ich o«k 
eurred onXy a few niles frcwi ihe post knowa as the Ifayfield 
Aftw t*io ŷ ars of aXnoet mtitimAX «tru|ftgM̂  tie ar«̂  
I-. •'I  ̂ .-a-
wmM forced to give up the fl|̂ t for the line ©f forte aloJig 
the Bozema Trail* By e t̂ reaty of; pefce with the Xi»iiaii» in 
id6S, the gweroÂ i «%r̂ ifd that â  ̂ country iyin$̂ |«t 
f̂ the Big Kora Mofot̂ ae ehouXd be regarded as the ife«t«r«i 
extent!on of the Sioux reservation in Didkota. Xn thii regioni 
the 310UX were to hunt the ImffaXo ae they had donii for Biiaber-
lees yeara. the whites were neither to traverse nor ocĉ '̂' 
the area*̂  
Thus, the first attMipt of the . amy to move aXong a route 
of emigration into Montana with a Xine of forts failed. On 
March 2, General Grant gave the orders to armsk up the Xine 
of posts, init it was weXX tmrards August before the three foar%s, 
G. F. Salth, Reno, and Xearaey, were abandoned.̂  Foî  Sjnlth 
%mB burned to the grouiKi by the Indiana isueĉ î î  after the 
soldiers had Xeft*̂  ̂
59. Xbld.. pp. X59-X7X. 
40. I* 4fftWf aâ  §ym5m* tWm̂ ln̂ on, 
klm J. K. SchofieXd, •'Report of." Jleport of th# Seĉ 4ag» of 
War. xbq$. Xd̂ )'j f, 
42* Hebax̂  ai»l BarlninstQoX. oo. cirt.. footnote jp* 257* 
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The armf had not wished to ai»«Bdon the linef sinoe a gẑ iat 
de«X of tisffi, effort* and soney, 4$ -mXX as Xoss of ;4ifê  had 
gone into the struggle to estaoiish it« deneraX 3hem̂  argued, 
ami he was correct,that the Indians wouXd Xook e«i the with-
4rawX as « sign of weakness snd iatansify their mttseic ̂  other 
points* Hot onXy that» Sheman wsraed, î ut th# 
probabXy have to reestablish these forts within a few years to 
suod̂  the Sioiuc*̂  
In the end the an&y was foroed to adhere to the govermients* 
decision in the matter. The Seearetary of War, J. M, SohofieXd 
triVKi to ease the dlsappointaeni of the anay by stiteî  that 
the t̂ ad had ̂ easedi to be of any further vaXue ̂ eehstruct-
iiOgiiOf the Union Pacifio EaiXrOSd> î se teniintis IbiKi êeil 
eatteî ed west of tjie Black HiXXs, made it easier for the wagoM 
to trairfX by an oXder and better road into Montana west of the 
•ouatains*̂  ̂ This r<mte and the Mistouri Hiveir traffic had 
î pXaced the Bosenan traiX. 
Y;̂  ' ' 
 ̂ of > ssfiSEl si %asi* 
xa6i9> (Washington, Xdo9}y I, p» 23. 
44# Shepsm,̂  ''Report ofi" X36% eit>. p. 59, 
45. Schofieid, "Report of,*' l$6̂ , iaj. cit,. p, X. 
CHAPTER \n 
THE MISSCSIII EIVKR ROUTE 
At the Atum tine that the ftrsay was siBrchiag into Montaiia 
frem the south, and was constracting the posts along the ibose-
nan Traij., it was also oeginning a prograai which was to lead 
it into central Montana following the other great artery of 
travel to the gold rields*-«>the Missouri Elver. Much the swae 
ad the Boieman Trail* tr̂ ŷ fie to the gold fields in Montana 
and Idaho Increased in leaps and bounds during the early six­
ties. With the arrival of the first steaaooat at the landing 
at Fort Benton, an era of trenendous river transportation 
began which had to be protected*̂  
Trouble soon arose near Fort Benton, between the Indians 
and the unites, as almost always was the ease when twites be­
gan encroaching in large nurabers upon the Indians* lands. In 
thie case, it was t̂ e Blo<Kis and blackfeet proper, ̂ Aio rosen*̂  
ted the croiirdiî r in of the white loan. In 1865, trouole seeaed 
so iminent that Upson, the Xî iaa agent, demanded iaaediate 
2 amy protection at Tort Benton. Other reports of the tense 
X. KiraBi M.* Histô  of £arl̂ |̂f|t|»t*fî  ̂Mâ jgâ on 
l̂Ŷ f7f̂ lî f̂\he*SCippewa reached to within 15 aixes of 
Benton. The next year she and the Key igest. reached Benton. 
2. "ConBsissioner of Indian Affairs, Report of," Annual Heport 
of the Secretary of interior, Hmm. 
First Session, >9th Congress, TWashington, 1865), Hf P* 
434. 
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sltaatlon in northern Montana reeî ed the ansy headqaartera 
at St* i«oul8* Oeneral Sherman autteed u]p the Bl|uatloa in a 
letter to Oenerai. Grant, t̂at0 that aXthouĵ  he did 
«ot appiPeheiid a general Indian uprisings for years/there would 
j|}Fobab̂ ^̂  oe an unpleaiMdat state of hoiM#ility io the area, 
t#î $̂ ated̂ ;̂f9iiî l̂  ̂ deatructidd:.. of the hd'atile 
;;il9p̂ 8* "to lk«c(kipiiilit: this> it would'''l»e' neceaaary' to put-tî pa;. 
î ar ŵ ere theae ,troai3leooie» IfKiiaoV Mved*«aloi3̂  hlaae of 
the l̂ ocky %uiitain8»̂  
Felleiiiriî  thia line of tlseû t, Qeneral 3hen&an inmedlato 
ely put BMili iiBto the field to amp out Uie beat courae of 
aetiĉ  to f4>llew in placing theae trcopa. 
aent into the territory tMitween the Miaaiaaippi Hiver and the 
l̂ aeifle Coaatt to inveatigate and report upon the actual con* 
ditioQa in tbia Indian country. 
M̂»nf these mn waa Inapecter-OiBiiieral D* Sackett, î oae 
assifOB̂ nt was to explore and inveatigate the conditions along 
the Miaaouri Hiver, and through ̂ lontana and Idaho. Sackett 
waa to laake recoguaendationa to head<parters so that the oeat 
general plan could oe worked out for stioKilsting the aettleo 
nent of Montana, and for protecting the people there, ̂ til 
they were strong enough to protect thesseelves frcai Indian 
3, "Protection Acroaa the Continent.* Houae Executive Doc-
ument. So. 23. Second Seaaion. 39th Concreaa. (Washington, 
135551, Vol. 6, p. 9. 
attack. âmr&X ShetmAn i'igured tbat the alnlng settieaenta 
were abXe to protect theoaeXveaj, ajad was priaartiy tntereat̂  
1.4 the ccf»iltioQ or the raQChera and â tliera who had spread 
out frott the mining areas into the Sua and Dearborn Uhter 
areast and aast into the valleys of the Madison, Gallatin, and 
êffersî n Rivers» SheztBan wished to kt̂ w if MonCana cĉ ld 
preface grains and food stuffs in sufficient qû t̂ities to 
suppo|!% her growing population* He also wondered 
could produce enouĵ  hay to winter animals» so that he ecu2̂  
send cairalr|r into the region.̂  
Inspector 3acket.t began his tour of inspection fr̂ pfm Olaha 
early in May, 1366̂  and traveled up the river tqr steaaier, sto]̂ « 
ping at tfcMt posts already estaulished to protect the river 
route, Fort llandall, Sully, Eice, and Berthold* Isftiile im̂ vlng 
up the river, Sackett encountered a group of men returninf to 
the States from tjhe vicinity of Fort Benton, Ke learned 
t̂ em that there was isuainent trouble anticipated with the 
dlackfest near itenton* The whites in the vicinity feared 
that there might oe a general Indian uprising, for alreadŷ  
there had been several Indians and whites killed in sporadic 
fighting. 
from Usis point on, liispect̂ or Sackett played an iliportant 
fsiart in fdvî ng the army's polled in penetrating Montana via 
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the Missouri River route* Sackett reported to headqttâ iil*fi 
t̂ he news of trouble in northern Montana, and reeoaKencied that 
ail precautions aheuid oe taken to prevent a war with the 
Indiaae there. If a four to six corapany post couid t3«e loeated 
soaewhere near Fort Benton, or at a point which could prajride 
the best protection for northwestern Montana, it would pro|>lt>-
ly settle the situation for the time. Sackett farther rrnmm" 
laended that aobe g>£ the eoldiers that were then on the way î y 
Gteaiaer to already estaolished posts along the Miasouri ̂ ould 
have their destinatiotn changed to Montana, Their places coiild 
be filled with soldiers frost Pert Eandall, %̂ lch he theught 
could be abandoned. Backett recoaiaended that the amy wire 
ahead of the boats, or send express messengers by j.and, to in* 
tercept the boats, and inform the troops of a change in des­
tination, It is possible that his advice was followed, for 
troops reached Montana soon after he did. 
After sending his reports to headquarters, con­
tinued his inspection tour by investigating the facilities 
at Fort Union. He found that the equipiaent and supplies left 
by Captain Greer and his men the preceding year were in good 
ŝ ape, but that the fort was not an ideax location for an 
army post. His choice for the post to be put near the aiouth 
of the f̂ellowstone would oe at the site of old Fort William, 
which was about three mixes aoove Union and had a gQod laodiâ , 
good timber, gru&s-, x̂ nd fertile lands, for cooatructing; and 
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a«intaiiilng an array post, 3odn after he entered Montanar 
S4eketi iraa surpriaed to leara that the ax̂ y had injBiedi%ei:y 
Jtoiloifed his mggmtion. Troops had arriv̂ d̂ at Fort ilnlon 
on June 13» and oegun eonstruetioh work on a fort» known as 
Fort Buford̂  on the s$te that he had reciffiuaendad in his re** 
port. 
Traveling up the Missouri to Fort Benton, Colonex Saokett 
gained first hand infomietloh and data on the cmî try ̂ ar the 
rlver«. Ha found thfet there was fairly good timOer aloiig its 
course as far as the aiouth of the Musselshell Elver, and soee 
as far as the foot oJt Cow Island* However, fr&m there on was 
little tinoer, except for a fairly larf.e stand of cottonŵ ed 
at the Biouth of the Judith Hiverw Sackett did not think that 
the Judith was the proper place for a post, even though there 
seesed to be ̂  neeessity for soae protection between Cow 
Island and iiauphin*s Rapids, where the steamers were forced 
to work slowly up along the river bank. Sackebt recoiram»nded 
that the fflost appropriate site would probauly be near the 
mouth of the Î sselshell f«iveir« 
At Fort iienton, Saokett investigated the trouole î hat 
had occurred with the Indians and found that-it wae caused 
f̂roa the hostility; of the #loie4 i|ii4 «̂ckf«|et ImiiaiEts, %̂ o 
had t̂ eir ntAr t̂ e head of the î caroome 
Rivers. However, he did not think that benton was a desir-
aolfe poft site. Thefl was no iilkber within tailes, and it 
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was hard to get hay and othar supplies necessary for a post# 
He reported that Fort i:ienton was not really the head of nav* 
igation on the î i9S0uri» for it was almost iapossible to 
reach, except oy the lî test steamers or during ejccessively 
high waters. To prove his.point* he noted that out of 24 
steftoiers iĤ ich started for if'ort lienton in 1̂ 65* only two ,, 
had reached their destination at benton, Most of thma did 
not even r̂ ach as far as Cow Island, out were forced to dis­
charge their cargoes soae distance t>elow 'ort Union. He 
concluded, that if boats could reach Fort Union, they could 
reach Cow Island or the iBouth of the Musselshell. Near one 
of these points should i>e placed a post to protect river 
traffic. 
While atiil at Fort Benton, Sackett was startled to read 
in a Montana newspaper General Order Nuaber 5t Head(|amrters, 
iJepartaent of the Platte, designatinis the ̂ irst Battilllon, 
i3th Infantry Regiment to proceed to Fort iienton and estab­
lish a post somewhere in l̂ at vicinity. 
IiuBediatej.y, Inspector Sackett sent a letter to Colonel 
Isaac V. liecves, who was in coiî and of the Montana region, 
offering further advice on the proper location for tiie north 
Montana post, wackett wrote: 
.... benton is certainly no place for a post. There is 
not a stick of timtjer or of wood even,̂  within miles of 
it, nor is it in aucb danger froa hostile Indians* My 
iffipression is the new post sho.ld oe placed upon the Sun 
River near its junction with the f̂ issouri—that is, near 
m 
the great faxxs of the Kiasouri. kLl accounta agree that 
it ia a aoat oeautifux spot with abundance of tiniser, 
plenty of graaa, good water, and ia the ooxy place o®ar 
bentm «̂ eî  graas irowa high enough to make good hay* 
By going a short distance at>ove the nouth of the Sua Elver 
on the Miaaouri any quantity of moat excellent pine tioioer 
ean oe had and eaaily rafted doim to the post* fhe point 
thaiit I h&ve designate appears to m to poasesa alt the 
requisites necessary for a militsry poaî  toaldeft lawfeing 
within short atrlHing diatanee df the atronghold of the 
Moods, now in opê n hostility with the 
Then, in a report to headquarters at St. Jbouis, 
continued his argtî nt that the Sun Ftiver loeaiiCNQ wils the 
best site for a post. The Catholics had a niasion tĥ re itt 
one time, and it was well known that they never picked a bad 
l&catî  for a ttission. This site wouxd protect perfectly 
the road oetiî i.n Benton and Helena, oesides all of the north-
w«ste:rn part of Montana, Still another point In favor of tebe, 
location was the fact that just aioout opposite the atouth of 
Sun, on the east aide, was the mouth of iieep Creek, This 
strt̂ aa ran throuiâ  a ueautiful valley to the soutb-eatt, 
offering a most excellent naturaJL road to the headwaters of 
the Musselshell, In the very heart of the Indian hustlng 
groumis {>etween the Yei.lowstone and Missouri ̂ iverl* 
Sackett explained that this hunting grouxkd shouiu ue 
opened to the aiiners, as the Crows «̂ o claimed the land, imt 
vhad been driven out oi it 4>y t-h' Sioux,, v*ere wllllî , accoixi-
Ing to Governor Heagher, to s41i It̂ aiKi go en a preservation. 
in conclusion, SaCkett su/tgested that a post should 1)9 
estaî lished early in the spring at some point on the Missouri 
70 
JRlvdr t̂ etween the laouth of the MugsejtihQli and th« rapids 
aoove. With this post, th« one on tho Clark's Fork of the 
XoXXowptoî  ̂and tba one on the Sitii ̂ ivor» and with tha Indian 
title extinî uishfid to the land tiatlieon, it liquid render all 
the terriliory %fest of a lint drawn froia 0£ tjbf 
ilusaolahall to tha nouth of the bighorn coaĵ irativ̂  ̂ safe for 
l̂ ite settlement* '"tirith this trio of pbatŝ * 
Montana will have'-all-the «il|.ta'iP̂ -proteo'tioft 
î îrt'* .Cataiiiî ;̂ sb«- doee not 'Wint# niHUB|̂ r''̂ f̂'G 
h o r s e s  a t  e a e f a  p o s t  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d '  
In«pe$t6r '§iiiekett was- entirely wron̂ . iî \hli:;la#jt' eon̂  ̂' 
elusion, as was proven in later years «̂ «n oaralry weî  omlled 
for on sany ̂ ecasions. He n̂ s also wrong in ixls idea that 
Montana would only need the three forî  he aentiooed* tet, 
his poiley ot enclosing central Montam with a ring of posts 
so that t(he eettlement of this aẑ a could be obtained was 
follomfed aliaoat exactly to the letter. The Indians did not 
give up tlie land in cantral Montana, as Sao)c«t̂ t was inforaed 
they w<rald do* Therefore, it was necessary for Uie ariay to 
expand its* line of forts into the Judith Basin to ferrit 
them out. 
'49v 'Alx of the i?ifoll|iiiti|}]t C#̂ taitied ia 'the 
>wSlgihee* to Zms-pector 3a'̂ «Mi<?s'''ideii«",oii'''thê  army- in-
Montana Contin-
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The soldiers moving up the Missouri to estsulish the post 
in tt$« vl<linity of Port ̂ ntOH arrived ixi the mtvam t>f 1866, 
and mtch against the uetter judgement of I'lajpr William Clinton̂  
}iAio was in coiaaiknd, established a teisporary caap site at the 
otouth of the Judith ̂ iver. Clinton aip;reed with Sackett's 
decision that the place was not an ideal location for a post, 
but it hwi enough tiaoer for a temporary winter camp* so- here 
he stayed all winter with his Battalion of the 13tli Infantry.̂  
It is prodaole that one coapany of this gro>up spent the winter 
at Fort Benton at the request of the Indian ai;ent, for, thou|̂  
there is no mention of what troops stayed theret it i« kaoiwiQ 
7 that one corepany was present during the winter of 1666-1̂ 67• 
Much has been said atiout the location of Caap Cooke, as 
Clinton's winter camp was naned, for it took on the aififict of 
a Bore permanent post during the following year. •̂ Dspector«> 
General Hasen, who made an inspection tour for the Jeparteent 
of the Platte in the fall of 1̂ 66 up the ijoseaan frail to 
fl̂ rt C. F. Ssiith and then across to Canp Cooke> reported: 
"The post at the mouth of the Judith River is at a point t̂ ere 
neither white nor red men ever ̂ o, and the location is subject 
a 
to ridicule wherever I go." i«ieutenant Colonel Holabird, who 
6, î ieutenant Generax Sherman, "fieport of," Anmtai. Report of 
the Secretary War. iS6V, (Washington, 1867U I» ?• 5̂ . 
7. Coues, j2£. cib.. p. 263. 
S. "Inspection oy General Ruslinf,," s£. git.. p. 4. 
7J> 
made a reeonnaiaaaace through the area in 1069, reĵ rted:̂  
Thla unfortunate |>|iidt la situated on the ri|̂ t of 
tha Mlaaourl Elver, at tha aouth of the û o» aSfe 
t)OttoB8, aaturated with axkall,̂  It is entirely ov̂ mm 
with rata» and nay i>G said to Ise in proceaa of desolition 
by ',7% st̂ rehouaea -In ruine; they iMreteh'-
e<iiy-̂ c;ona%û t«dCl.n "̂ he tniitâ nde,',,, ••nothing •since 
hall ieip;..dd»a, '|̂ .fpiBdy their'#tioWcoaiiî a*-, Qeneral 
n«gXaCt and'indlffaience characterize the poat. the 
saall j;arriaon aerely holda on la spite of the rata* fhe 
Indiana have noved away and left it alone» 
l/doite iaa- altver of antbh Ui!l§ to the army in Montana« 
and after the first year of ita' aaciatenceĵ  when it waa uaed 
aa a point of departure '̂ or other aaalgnnenta in the area, 
it deteriorated rapidly and waa aoandoned in the aprit:!US 
The post was located in an out of the way place, and 
could only aerve aa a protection to boats paasing up the 
river over Dauphin's Rapids. In this instance, the btw. pol> 
icy laid down oy Sackett was IgnoiHsd and* failed. If the anay 
had e8tai»lî «d a poat near the BKmth of the i4ussexâ ll« aa 
Backett had reeommended, and aa was iMntioned froa tiaia to 
tiise in other reports, the operations in northern 2%nt.ajlpi 
wouxd have been carried out naich more smoothly. Aa it was, 
the jurttiy did not know exactly wfeere to pxace this pest on the 
9m "fieeonnaissance in the iiepartiaent of î akota," Sfqate-̂ exec­
utive Document. l«o. S, Thix̂  Sesalan, 4i8t C<mgf#8a, 
Ti&̂ ington, 1869), Vol. I, p, ?• 
IQ. Genera J. 'suinifred- S.. -Hancock, "Report of.,,-" 
k̂ >̂ grt of . Secretary of te'ar. i.870, {WashingtoQ̂  1870), 
Vbl. "X, p., 
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MlBsotiri, and mad# aeverax half-hciarted attempts, ̂ ich ac-
ĉ piiî ad veî  -iittie. 
One of these attempts was mads at Fort ienton. The amy 
had stationed n̂ Q there in the Irtiitar of 1866̂ X867» t>ut they 
were reaoved iri the spring. Tx̂ p# were statloni4 thê  for 
several years gu the supplies which arrived dy stoiawr̂ J 
and in 1069» the arny leased the old fort buildings and set 
11 
up a ailitai7 reservation of 324 square ailes around 
It was never oore than a one eoapiny post, however, and served 
only as a depot for goods conini; up the Missouri. Beiiton was 
12 
discofitinaed as a military post in Iddil, although the 
fort t>ttilding;s had been abandoned in 1675» and a eanp set up 
outside. 
the other attempt was nade uy the army near the noutli of 
the ilusselaiiell River. This point had oesn reeoaaiended as the 
location for a post both by Sackett and Haaen. HaSen had 
reecffiuaended that Cooke ue moved in the fall of IS69 to t̂  
south of the Musselshell,̂  ̂but the goods were reaoved to Fort 
i>enton instead. However, troops were maintained oh the 
Ix. ^̂ Reconnaissance in Dakota," cit.. p. 30. 
12. iirigadier General Terry, "Report of,** Annual Report of 
JiM fi£ lac, isai, I. p. 96̂  
13 • fiurlingaaer OP. cit.. t>. 196, 
-14. "̂ Reeonaaissance ifi Bakoî A," OP. cit. . p.* 4. 
15- l̂ Jor Generai. Hancock, iS'/O, cit.. p. 2&, 
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?'"ussex5heil for 8(»Be time after tirevet i.ieutenant Coionei 
Mugent and iOO men of the i3th XnfflMfitiiy estaoiished a susMier 
c€usp there in ̂ oy of The oniy distinction thet this 
site achieved wat; that of a sumtaer cafisp, thoUiĉ h it achieved 
• aome impprtaî <» wbeii a |ropo«ed r&.a4 
'5  ̂ '• 
, ..5*.  ̂ ' • •,:• • - • ; •;•-,• •• •• :, 
between Carroii, the vixxage near the mouth of the riverj airii 
BeÔ ena in 
It wjSs on the rdcdassendation of inspector Kazen that €affip 
Cooke Wî s aijandĵ ned. |t is interestinf, to note that oesidee 
r -i. 
agreeing with Inepector Sach«tt on the matter of Cooke, his 
investigations and sugî estione on the arayVs policy in Montana 
;3ire very sioixar to iiackett*s 
iirevet Major Generâ . u. Ha2«n came lUtto >'tontas4 aoout 
the sarse time that ̂ acV.ett did, thou|;h he entered via the 
<>02edan trail. 4>ike 3ackott, Mazea rec<Hteended the astalK 
lishaent of a. post on the ûn Hivefr, pointing out that the 
road between Benton unci Hei&na waf an iciportr̂ it one and c#uid 
oe iidequateiy protected from that point, iiecause of the abun­
dance of grass in the aiea, which suited the location for 
cavalry, Hawen advised Veydquerters to estaulirh a two conipany 
16, Brevet Major Oener;.l Alfred H. Ter̂ , "lieport of," Annual 
^ ̂̂gficret^flrv siL mhj:, i^'^68, (Wa^iee»on, 
17. iirî adior General 4. H. Yerry, ••Repwrof,** Annual report 
of the Secretary of âr. i3'/4, (Washi ugtion, I874), I # 
p. 137 
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cavalry post ther<̂ , &ut strangeay enough, the post on the Sun 
Elver became one of the few entirely infantry posts in l>lontana* 
This greatly hattpered Its' efficiency in later yearf* 
Both Sackett and Haxen recommended that, as the head of 
navigation was really near the mouth of the Musaelshell, the 
government should construct a military road froiB this point 
into the adning are iS of western Montana. However, they had 
different routes in nind. 
General Hasen was prioiarily interested in the route of 
the Boxeiaan trail, and wished to supply some of the Trail's 
posts via the head of navigation on the Missouri. He pointed 
out that a road froa the Musselshell to Fort C. ^̂ th 
could easily i>e constructed and would oe only auout IDO niles 
long* The road could fork upon reaching the Yellowstone, with 
one branch going on down to Fort C. F. Smith, and the other 
aranch reaching up the river to the new post to be established 
there. The road could̂ ĥen continue on over the Bosentan Trail 
into the mining areas. 
Inspector 5ackett was more interested in following the 
naost direct route t«j the fields. He recommended that a 
first cxfiss military ruad, e;,arting near the mouth of the 
'lusseishell a:ui running southwest uetweexi the î lussel̂ shexl 
liJ. Inspection oy Generax uuej-ing and lissen, 22* dt*. 
p. 2. 
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River and the Judith liasin, p&£3ing ty the south of the belt 
Mountains, then wsftt and northwest aiooĵ  this raô e into the 
Missouri Vaixey, oe constructed. Ai'ter reaching the iiiesouri, 
this road could go etraif;bt west and hit the Mullan Road at a 
point aOout 15 miles north of Helena, âekett poifited out 
that this route passed throui;h the geographic center of Mont­
ana, as weljL as the laininp; center of the territory, from 
this route* roads could be constructed very ©asily along easy 
grades to all pjirts of the Territory.̂  ̂
i4t̂ -î  done at the time upon these recomiaendations, 
out a few years later, it is intî re&tini; to notei, again the 
anoy followed the advice of t̂ aekett, and constructed a road 
along the route he had recoMsitided. ProOauly ô Cjause of the 
abandonment of the line of posts Along the obzeaan trail, 
little was done on Hazen*s recomflien̂ ation until the last post 
had oeen outlt in central Montana. 
After the anay had noved iî o Montana on 3aek6tt's advice, 
to furnish soae protection for î enton and vicinity, xittle was: 
done until the following suraoier* Companies a, *>, 
G, and H, of the j.3th Infantry spent the winter at the mouth 
of the Judith Hiver, two -iiore coiapardei of the oaiae unit, 
I and K, waited in Fort jbsavenwOrth for the spring thaw to 
to open the î iissouri Kivcr to craffic, so thiM̂  they coald join 
- i-". " " 'V " -I ii., 
• '•&."! "*• 
19. , taction Across the Contioent,'* op. ci%., p. 4?« 
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their (Sutfit. Tvip cQ?jpanie» of the 30th Infaatry, I ana K, 
20 were also waiting to accoiapany thera into Montana. 
To cover the new territory they were moving into, the 
Department of iiakota was divided into two divisions in «Janu-
ary, 1867. One wac Stiiown as the î istrlct of Minnesota, and 
the other, to cover Montana, was known as the Ufper Missouri 
District. 
In June, 186?, Coaipanies A, C, D, and F, of the î th Irt-
fantry were detached fro® Camp Cooke, and ordered to Sun River 
to establish a new post. Company I .nd K were to accompany 
them, out did not arrive untix later in the surmner. When they 
did arrive. Company K was ordered to stay at the landing at 
Fort Benton to protect the stores and supplies which were un­
loaded there for the new post. Company I continued on to the 
new site, where it assisted the other four companies to construct 
the Sun River post.̂  ̂
20. iileutenant General iihê *̂̂ » 2£. £jLJe.> P9* 49. 
1 ̂î  * « p. 49. 
22. luid., pp. 4̂ , 49. 
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?rotectia& afsd bettimem 
the Sî it RiiTQ]* p«8t was on© of the key points in the 
tî  %î tect central Montana froia the Indiana of 
the Biaekfeet ô îons* These tribeŝ  the f̂ iegan, Slackfeett 
and espieialiy tlie Blood, had their hemes eiear the head-
i«atei9 dif thê  l̂ arl̂ ĵ t and Sun Elvers and in northern Mon­
tana* and were eofftĵ ipaiiy sXt|>̂  down iitto the setti-enents 
of the GaXXaillt Vâ liy on raids. One ®f their favoirî te 
crossing plaees of the Missouri River was Ĵ st aiM>ve the 
aouth of ths Sun. Here the Missouri iaeoans lAik 
lower, and therefore easier to cross. Elvers such as the 
Marias, Teton, 0«arbome, and the Sun 4rai;ich«d off the 
aiaia streiiii near this point, whlie the Missouri reached to 
l̂e south, getting saalier and ffaaXler as it neared its* 
headwaters, the î ortest, safest, and nost direct route for 
the parauding Indians was near the aKmth of the River. 
Thet«fore, the army felt that a strong post was neê sary at 
this point. 
As the location of the post had i>eeR chosen with eare 
troti inforsuition gathered ttvm investigators sent into %>n-
ta&a, it would seem that the post was Ideally located. Yet, 
it was rê rted later, the site would have 4>een siore perfect­
ly situated if it had been placed on the Kissouri mai* the 
Bwuth of the Suii.̂  At the time, hoiwsver, it was thought to 
be more «pproprlate to locate the post't>etii#een the Indiane 
and the Fort Bentoa-Heiena wagon road, so it was placed 
at>out five miles West of the Sun River crossing, and almost 
15 miles west of the Missouri Elver# 
Thus, it was placed, as General Sheraan recomoiended, 
near the Eocky Mountains and the seat of the Indian trout̂ le 
In the area—the home of the Blackfeet. Further extention 
to tho west was unnecessary in the years followlî , for the 
pattern of settleiaent felx in the which was east of 
the upî r reaches of the Missouri, and north of thiS Yellow­
stone—the very heart of Montana. 
The general location of the post seemed adatirably 
situated. It was hear the wagon road, which was a constant 
source of trouole, and was approximately a half«way cttap 
l̂ etween the head of navigation on the Missouri and the 
. . s 60 miles froot Fort Bentwa, and 
fflinini; caumps. The post wa 
do ffiiles fro« Helena* Only 15 miles from the Missouri 
River, it seemed to solve the proolem of Indians grossing, 
while it was also within easy reach of Cadotte pass, the 
Indians* path across the mountains only 0̂ ailes directly 
to the west, itill another point in favor of its* location, 
1. Major General Hancock, "Report of 1869," cit., p. 
59, ~ 
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already aentioned in Sackett*8 report, was the post*8 access 
to the excei.i.eiit road offered oy Deep Creek into the Vfiry 
heart of the Indian hunting grounda in central M̂ otaiui* 
Major WiJlliaia Ci-inton eataolished the poet on June 30» 
iS67, with the fovwr coaspaaiea of the Ji.3th •'̂ lif̂ try utoo had 
spent the preceedilig wi nter at Ĉ p Ĉ ooke, andi nanid :the 
2 the site Canp Eeynolda. This naine was chanf̂ ed to Fort Shaw 
01̂  August I, when work on the post was well started* ârt 
of the Bten were forced to live i a tent a during the f list 
winter, as only three seta of officers quarters half of 
the eos3pĵ ny*s barracks were erected before cold iiffit̂ t̂ isr set 
in* The OuiAdinrs were Aade of adobe brick due to a l̂ ck of 
tieiOer in the vicinity, and litile use was made of liuaber at 
3 first except for door, and window frames and shingles*"̂  
From its* beginning, the Sun River post was one of the 
ffiajor posts of &he sray in tiontmna. It was regimental head­
quarters for the army in Montana, and was one of the aost 
pretentious and costly, tb# fort was constructed around the 
usual 400 foot parade grouod, out the Duildinge were larger 
thiui usual in western forts. Bomt idea of their sise is 
given in the fact that the four company barracks were 102 
2« Fort Shaw was QiiiMsd in honor of Colonel Eooert G. Shaw, 
54th Massachusetts Volunteers, (colored) kixied at Fort 
wagner, «?uly Id, 1063. 
3. ft. A. i-eeson. A History at iaiMBa, lOi-iMSt (Chicago, 
1405), p. 200. 
ex 
feet long, the hoepitaX feet with wings added, a guaẑ  
house and .p̂ soit 63x31 ftiet I t̂ txA a atore house 90x34 feet 
with winga 6xx39 feet each.̂  
Altĥ gh the, post 1)̂ 8 well planned, the work on the 
buildings was not done with care, for laieri, it waa reported, 
all of the buildings had settled out of ship#, while aofoe of 
the roofs had caved in* The oeiling Joists were too sooall 
for the duty they had to p«trfor«.̂  
Uo rttcord was kept of tiua cost of constructing the post, 
as mort of the work was done ay the soldiers garrisoned there, 
this aeeaed to ye a coosBon practice in western forts for 
loŝ ctor Ssckett complained of this haoit niheo he eiuM̂  into 
Montana on an inspection tour. However,,in the case of Fort 
Shaw, an ectiî ated cost of the post oy ld69 was ̂ v«n as 
Ild7,0l3.49.̂  
ideated as it was, in such a strctcî ie position, 
effect of the fort was sailed the fact that only infantry 
were stationed there. This, in spite of the fact that repoxts 
eontimtally stated that it was the only spot near Fort Benton 
K̂ ere there was sufficient grass to maintain a cavalry post. 
The Indians had little respect for the poet and xater, when 
4. siurlingame, ît.. p. 200. 
5. •̂ Reconnaissance in the Dakota i>epartiaent," op. cit.. p»,6> 
6. Burlingwae, (gji- cit.. p. 202. 
punitive expeditions war® oade agninst them, cavmi.*!? had to 
br<mgii|. in I'rpm otter p̂ st© to prefs the cafflipaiĵ »« 
the pd»t »erv«d some purpose in th® ieiiddiat# vieii»ity, 
for aettier® uovfid iAto the Sun %ver with tjhtt aroqft «itd soon 
dotted the VAiiey with their ho»e». the paWoX® 
jpiard tho pass to the êat oi»o had Bome succ«afi» in controi-
ling the ffloveaent of the X̂ ians fro« th® i«o$t«irQ ©id« of the 
atountains into centrai. Montana. However, the Indians contiii* 
ued to raid th© Gaiiatin Vaii#y for years 6ft̂  tfee poet wae 
constructed. More than likely these raids î re SMide by 
er̂ s&inf the Missouri near Fort Menton and passing thnmgh 
the Belt %untaine into the Gallstin Valley.̂  
With the establiahBent of Fort Shaw, the amy carried 
out the second part of its' encircling aoveaent. Army control 
had Ueen extended up the Miscouri to the mouth of the Judith, 
now it stretched along the Missouri in northera Montane to the 
foothills of the llocky Mountain. Posts had seen Oased on the 
Judith, at Bent<m, an̂  stow on the Sun. 
In a very short tine, the third pArt of the novanent was 
C<»ipleted, This move was in the establishî nt of a post at 
the eastem end of the Gallatin Valley. AOout 100 tttiles to 
the south of Fort Shaw, the Madison, Gallatin, and Jefferson, 
Rivers unite to fom the Missouri. One of these three forces. 
7. '*Heconn«l8sai*«e in the Dakota yepartaaerit.," cit.. p. 6* 
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the Gallatin, flows sharply to the east. It was on the upper 
reaches of the Gallatin that Fort was ouilt* thus, 
the army extended Its' eontrol in a sweeping circle around 
the fertile area of central Montana. 
The history of Fort ̂ liis is closely related to the 
atteapt of the army to extend its' control into Montana along 
the xioseetan Trail. In that line of forts, the final post was 
to ue constructed Just east of iSOiiiefflan pâ sf This post would 
prooaoly have oeen constructed even after the trail was aî an-
doned̂  if trouble had not risen in the Gallatin Valxey which 
rushed the army into i>uixding Fort £li4,8 on the western side 
of the pass."̂ ® 
After the abandoning of the line of forts n̂ ich included 
Fort Reno, Fetteroan, and C. F. Smith, the sottlers of the 
Gallatin Valley were left without protection fr<Ma the Indians, 
who had easy access to the valley throuĵ  the pasaes at the 
eastern end* When the settl«8ient*s leading citizen, John 
Boseoian, was kilisd within 60 Mies of one of these passes, 
terror spread throughout the valley. Roaes and possessions 
%#ere left unprotected as the settlers fled to the towns for 
Fort Bxlis. tyas natted in honor of Coxonex Augustus Van 
fifome iiilis, who was kill€ri t*hiie rendering a gaixaat 
servioe at Gettysiuurg. 
9. See Chapter V, p&ge 
10# (iaior General Stierman, "Report of 1h69," at,, cit.. p. 69-
£4 
proteetioii« Ur;geiit roquesta were «ent to the tfrritorlal 
govemaeat lin ̂ ieiui and to tĥ  i'eĵ isiriiX JiovernMent 
at Washington D* C.» asking for ifioaediatc aid in preventing 
an Indian invasion of the valley. Volunteer regisents viere 
raised in Montana and rushed into the field to defend the 
settlers. However, the amy did not entirely believe the 
reports as to the seriousness of the situation» and sent an 
axmy officer fros Salt i«iiice City to investigate the affair* 
His reports confirmed headquarters* beliefs that the people 
had been unnecessarily alarmed, and the volunteers were 
11 
asked to discontinue their plans of battle. 
To further investigate the st&tt&r, General Terry, in 
cowBtaiui of the area, also cffise into Montana. After examin­
ing the situation, he agreed with the investigating officer? 
and asked the volunteers to return, but they continued down 
the tellowstone Valley and fought a rather undecisive battle 
with the Indians there before disbanding. General Terry also 
laid the groundwork for another extention of the amy into 
Montana when he recois»euded that a fort ue established in the 
Gallatin Valley to ]»!H>tect the agricultural element there. 
' Orders for the construction of Fort i:>lli8 were issued 
12 
from Fort Shaw on August 7, 1̂ 6?. The site was picked &y 
11. lieutenant General Shenaan, "Report of,* Annuai. Report 
qL $!)m MmsSimsz st pp. 32, 33. 
12. Major General Alfred Terry, »Rep€r®t of .**t Annuax tteoort 
of the Secretary of ŝ ar. xa67-68, p. 53. 
I f i p M a e r ' a t ,  i i | i % l i i i | i f | ^ ^  , i m d  d f  
thd valley. It lay about 3 lailies daet of Bbifi^n Oitfi: 
at"'̂ ®' Cô 'tr/of ~th« p«»s-tutO 'the-'Xelxowstoae ¥all0''.V-'-4%oo :.... 
its ioeatioa, the i'ort had comaatkd or ttro pii«6#9 at south 
saŝ sm end afit̂ 0",>ajyL«y—trail Creek, and H-pcky-Xawycm̂ -î iy 
fiYS ailea *%#ay» to the ivaŝ ti was tiridger Ganyoft, anot}i<ir 
easy paas thrbugh the laountaina ̂ ordering the south aid# of 
the Talieyy alira five ailes away* Farther to the Kû rth ̂ re 
the ̂ lathaad and Slaekfoot passes which were withia easy 
piitrolling diatances* 
Hut̂  the saae as fort 3haw» the army deeid|@d a few yearir 
later that the fort would have been oa a »iuĉ  bett̂ if site if 
it had ti^ea loeated o^y a short distance to the south,or 
on the other hand, if it had ueea aoired into the Yellowstbiie 
?alldy aisid locat̂  near the aouth of Shiei.d*s Eiver*'̂  ̂ iUut, 
a# it was already almost completed, nothing wus done to 
correct the mistake. 
Construction of the post began in the fall of 1̂ 6? oy 
governaent contract, and by December, besides barracks, there 
were three auildings for officers quarters and a bakery fin-
in̂ ed. By January, a hospital, ccMomand house, guard house, 
13* "̂ connaissance in the î akota i>epartaeuxt,̂  jg£* I 
Ma|or aenerai Hancock. "Heport s Mmk flC 
at IiE» i®69, p. 69. 
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and a biacksmith houaa vrere coapXeted, with an Ice house 
iii]| added ta Fearuary. second terrace of officers t 
î uarters aî  tho stockade were cmpleted in Movember of the 
15 
sase year* ' The stockade inelosed an area of 390x455 feet» 
and waa ten feet high, insid© of which were the aaiii puild-
iogs of the po&t« An inspecting officer later reported that 
the stoelcade, besides euttlog off all the air from the quartifli» 
gave a fjerson the inpression Jhe in a prison rather than 
a 
lihen the construction work was eospietcKi, the barracks 
eonsiited of unhewn pine logs chinked with aortar and with 
pine boaẑ  floors, the cavalry stables of four log buildings 
roofed with boards, aiKi a log quartermasters stable roofed 
of TOd*"̂  ̂
7he t̂ ee ccispanies of the 13th Infantry under Captain 
U. itanotte, tdio occupied the fort during t̂ e fl̂ at two 
yeal*8« proved ineffective in defending the settlers, and in 
1̂ 69, Colonel A• Q, t̂ rackett and two companies of the 2nd 
Id Cavalry aioved in̂ vto replace thes. This nuaber was Increased 
15, M» A, i.ee8on, cit.. p, 200. 
16« "Reconnaissance in Dakota," op- cit«. p. 2. 
17* is. A, iitteson, op. cit.. p. 200« 
id. CoXonel 0» iirackett, Trip Through the EockyJsCount-
ains,* Contrloutions to Montana Historical Soeiety, 
(Helena! llioj. Vol. VllI, pp. 329-344. 
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to four cĉ panles of the 2nd Cavalry in 1̂ 72, along with one 
isoapany of the 7th Infantry, which remained the coapJLeoent of 
tihe post for some time. 
The work of the cavaxry proved more effective than the 
work of the infantry, and in the following years aany expedi­
tions were aent out to pureue and punish thf Indians attempting 
to raid the Gallatin Valley. 
One of the rost ilxustr&tip'e of these expeditions ŵ s 
one pjLanned in 1̂ 69 to stop the semuere of the lilackfeet 
nation froa making; their periodic raids into the valley a»d 
escaping through the Little £ielt Mountaina to the north. 
Plant -mre made for this caapsign in the suiamer of lB69, and 
were carried out the following winter, A treaty of peace and 
amtual friendship was offered to the Indians and a deadline 
set that they should aedt. \̂hen the deadline was reached and 
passed without a treaty oeing signed, cavalry from Fert liillis 
and infantry fro® Fort Shaw marched, in the dead of winter, 
after the recalcitrant Indians. On January 23, a Fiegan caap 
was found in the lower Marias iiiver area, and \vithout warning, 
was attack at dawn. hundred seventy three Indians were 
killed and 100 women and children captured. |orty women were 
killed in the fight when the soldiers fired into the teepees, 
v̂ en the news of the fight reached the people, storms of 
pratest swept over the country against such needless kixling. 
« cpudhing Diow wke doait the Piagam triim aa4 ao 
|l&rth«ir trduole vs'0 cmxB&d by th#ii in th® CalXifttln 
Beaido sending out ex]>editio)aa to punish the Indiaiiŝ  
foxlb l̂ ta siisirved ikany oih*r ̂ ĵ oies and could alaiost̂  be 
said tfO be a truliy representative western f43rt« $i«e of 
the services it later g4ve included the building; and jpatrol« 
ing of roads, furnishing escorts for railrô  surveys, estab* 
lishing telegraph lines, nftintainl̂ iiig pa||̂ l8 aiid «uaarar out* 
pdsts» and serving as a headquarters for i|xpeditions into the 
area of fellowstone Park by high government officials* There 
fieeais little doubt that it aceooipliahed a great deal in fa­
thering the settl«Bent of central Montaioa. 
However, as the settlements continued to î ow in central 
Kontana, it was found that Fort Ellis could not furnish all 
the protection that was niSeded for the area beiween Bllis and 
Fort Shaw. Diaiaood City had grown up to a good slued isiiiî ng 
towi about aiidway oetween the posts* It wwî M̂ar the aiain 
passes that were used by the Indian# to enter a|td leave the 
Qallatin Valley, and the oontin«ial appearance of the Indians, 
Blackfeet principly, caused the people of the area to fear 
for their safety. Under their solicitations a tesporary carap 
was established Koveoioer 30th, 1̂ 9> i>y one company of cavalry 
19» Major General Hancock, "Eeport of 1! Annual Rep̂ î  s£ MsL 
££ Ml* iW, pp. 29, 30. 
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for Fort liilia. Thê cavaiiTr w«re sboi-tiy r<sii«t6d oy a ftoitt-
pany ;:-oA; 'pieG.aâ ,̂; Bailor* 
In the spring of the next year, the cabtp was aoveci a 
short distance from ite' orî î i site, aocnit i> klies"ea#t 
of ̂ abkoii® ckty-f"'td> %ecui*%la'bWy-'̂  iocatioo*v; -̂the-. 
ca®p served it# p̂ rpoî e »© aaiy that the army decided t© 
oake it a raore pereanent canp and the troops were |mt to 
%»ork erectinf Ior £»arrack;p» storehoueiit, and aheds* , ̂ rig-̂  
inally it had been intended to l>e an outpost attached to 
fort ̂ iiia, t»ut on the firat of May, iS70, it asstuaad the 
20 
status of a separate and permanent post. iiy XB72, the 
ouiidings of the fort included, fiuarters made of logs for 
100 men, three officers quartera-»two of loge and one fraiae--, 
21 
two storehouses, a olock house, and a two story loi; Oiiixding. 
Several attempts were ntade oy the army to discontinue the 
use of Camp isaker in following years, but local influent# ̂ 
22 " ' 
was strong enough to fcecp it activated until Itl̂ * 
The name of the poet was changed to Fort i.ogan in l$77,t ih 
hcmor of Captain William Logan who was killed in the oattlce 
of the »ig Hole. Fort Logan was quite successful in guard­
ing the people around Uianiond City, and the passes through 
20« IMd.. p. 28. 
21̂  iiurlingaae, SE* ?• 2l3, 
22. Brigadier Oeneral Terry, "Report of," Annual Report of 
fi£ mm* p. 62. 
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through the belt Mountains, though the necessity of malataln-
Ing the post for so long is doubtful. In Octouer, i8dO» 
post was finally dismantled and most of the effects and troops 
ffloved to estauxish the final foart in the line used to open and 
23 protect central Montana—Fort Magiaitis. 
With the construction of the three naraed posts. Fort ShaWf 
Fort î llis, and Fort Logan, and the use of the two Mii&out'i 
Slvcr po9t8 at Fort î nton aî  Camp Cootee, the amy ̂ad ai* 
most furnished all the protection necessary for central Montana. 
The routes of transportation in the north and nest, up the 
Missouri and over the Helena w&gon road, were guarded and 
patrolled, fonaing a line of protection fro® the Blackfeet 
tri£>e8. The Indiaê  from the lellowstone were held oack oy 
the post between them and the settleaents of the Gallatin 
Valley, while the road frc»«t this post to Helena served as 
fitrther protection for central Montana from the Indians to 
the west south. The post at the base of the iielt Mount­
ains served as an added protection against any Indiana that 
might seep through the defense of the Fort Benton<*Uelena 
wagon road. 
In order to increase v.: o effieiency of the posts it 
had constructed in ilontana, the army o&g&n a program of 
23. "Report for the Sâ e of Fort Logan," Congressional Bee-
ords. House Resolution No. 5̂ 94, Second î ession, 4oth 
Congress, ('iiashingt®n, 46 I, Vol., 4O, p;. 2564-
91 
ffiiiitiary roads to expedite cc-viijayniĉ itionî - «-id t ... movement 
of supplies oetween the®. U|> untio. thi© time, the road frofic 
the head of n&vlgiA%ion at Fort iienton̂  which ran west of the 
Missouri past Fort î haw to Helena, had been used. Another 
iegt bad ueen added to oring Port Exiis iato contact with 
Fort- Shaw and bentori, by continuing the roaa east from Helena, 
let, this road was so long thijt most of the suj plies for Fort 
giiis caaio up frofis the south via the head of the railroad 
which had reached Corrioe. 
When Ga®p Baker was conotrxicted, a road had ueen made to 
coanect it with Fort Ellis, and this road was later extended 
to the northwest 4e far as Fort Shaw, urinring these posts 
into, cloeer contact with each other. Later, Cencrs.1 Hancock 
had suf̂ e ted that a survey for a r-oad to connect Fort ̂ opon 
and l̂ liis with Fort iicnton oe made on the south side of the 
.'Missouri. stated: Such a road, on the aoath side 
of the Missouri would ue an auditioiifia. defense for the 
settlwents from that quarter." Hancock suggested that it 
might t>e a <̂ ood idea to connect the posts in the Gallatin. 
Valley with the true head of the Missouri iiver traffic at 
the fflouth of the Hustsexshexl River. 
For some tirae the .irsy had oeen toid hhat the ilusaei-
»heil was resx̂ y the head o. navi/r?tion on the i4is80uri, and 
24. General Hancock, "Report of ££. cit.» p# oj. 
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in trying to shorten the routes of travel ovcriand, the ar«y 
finally acccpted this idea. 
Settlers bad tried to promotq the growth of a xanding at 
the mouth of the I4usseishei.i, and over a period of yearjs, the 
cotuaunity haJ foriaed a small village known as Carroll, The 
amy had furnished eomo protection for this area in ii?63 when 
Brevet Colonel Î uî ent and 100 men of the i3th Inf̂ n̂try had 
established a sunaaer catiip there*̂  ̂ i»ituxe was dô ne auout the 
actuax consti'uction of a road, however. 
i&'hen Generax Hancock assufflcd couuiiand uf the »4ont̂ na 
strict in i'l«y, 1S69, investigations into tVe practicatiility 
of such a road were iiiauĵ aruted. Hancock Bi. de an inspection 
tour of the arua he vvaa taking ovor and noted that such a 
roai ha i sdvar.ta/!:es that should ue looked into. He instructed 
Captain L, U , Cxi ft of the l3th Infantry at Fort î lils to 
explore the country uetweon Fort axlis and the oioath of the 
Musselshell, and the country uetwoen Hexena anu ohe same point, 
with t>ie view of finding if a road, with grass, water, 
on'i vjood, would ue found. Hancock had in mind the use of one 
road for a consid&raolc distance I'ron the 'ussexahell, to fork 
somewhere in the Judith oaslr.. One of these forks wa© to xead 
south to Fort i-iiis, and the other v-*estward to Helena. He 
25. i'iajor Cienernx Axfred Terr: "uonort of," Annuax Report 
tjhe Ŝ r̂fî r̂y jaM. p. 34. 
m 
stated that ijuch a road would Xacii.itai.c' traffic to the »©t-
txed aroas when t̂ ie (JiiBSOuri River wa® too i-ovf̂ to axxow iioatjs , 
to ĵ ach, Beriton. He also pointed ô t: 0̂  roiid would 
"te of ?rreat advantage to tho c .ffiEier̂ e &nd people of the country, 
in ©naolinr them to ?^et their suppiiee more cert.-^inlyj more 
pr̂ ptAy* and thea'̂ r̂V besides, a road wauid i>e a xine 
in froi'Jt of the eettxeusient® aî aintit Indians cô in̂  1frcw> the 
south#'* 
Captain Ciift and his cavalry escort Qcmpxet,̂  e>jplora*(r 
tions in two fflonths and reported Jback to he&dquarttsrs. baeinĵ  
his ideas upon this report, General Hancock coiicurr«d with his 
first Impression on the road and suf̂ psated that it ©ifrht oe 
advantageous to estaô î h a poot at the caoath of the Mussel­
shell and one at the f&rk of th« road in the Judith i#asin. 
Hd recc®iiÊ jnid0d that the two forts not *>e costly poats and 
should ue erected by the troops iseiat to garrison them, ifl̂ en 
the line of the Morthem Pacific raiiiro/id xihu deteriiiaed, on« 
26 
of the posts could oe made 01' a (sore permanexit natart* 
army did not take up the matter ©f the road at thi£ tiioc and 
it was five years oefore anything resulted from Clift*s survey. 
In 1.S74, Generai. ferry, who had af̂ ain reeumed controi. of 
the 4>akota iJepartment, was informed that an effort would ye 
made that year to open a new route of caciiaunication with the 
26. Hajor General Hancock, "iteport of j.S69i" op. clt., pp. op-
6 9 . '  
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settled portions of Montana oy the construction of a wapon-
road fro® Helena to a point on th® Missouri River near the 
mouth of the i4ua8«i8hei.i Jiiver* He was atiked to provide aiix-
itary protection for the proposed depot at the aiouth of the 
I'lu.gsei.shoi.l, fend for trains paseing over the route. Ĝ nerax 
Terjry was convinced, as General Hancock had oeen, that to 
construct this road i«vouid ue 4uite oeneficiax to Montar̂ . Ai.-
though the distance fro«a Fort Benton to Hexena was out 0*0 
caixes, while frcMS the siouth of the ̂ usseishell to the SnOte 
point was 2x0 loilee, yet the avoidaiice of the 350 raile« of 
extreaely difficuxt navifiation (̂ tween the two polnte on the 
rlvir would make the new route uy fat t̂ e most econcMical, 
lis addition to thiSi the season during; iî hicii the ̂ teaaere 
could carry freight into Montana would oe lengthened two aonths. , 
General Terry cooperated with the p-irtiea iuauK̂ rating 
road and had fth escort farniahed to the irien opening the 
route# Me axso directed that a eumaer canp of one ct̂ piin̂  of 
the 7th Infantry ue post..d at the viila§e of Garroll̂  and that 
another coî p̂any of the saae regtiment encamp at oî  î pring 
Creek in the Judith î asin at a point intenaediate uetvî en 
Carrol and Camp Bicker̂ 7 The work of orotectiag the road con­
tinued, for in the aext year, during June, two cfxapanies of 
infantry were sent out from /or̂  Shaw, one coiapany to take 
27. tirigadier Gene rax Terry, "Heport of Annual H,finoft 
the Secretary of war. xBV4-75* p. 3̂ . 
station at the forks of the IHussexBheJii. Eiver, aind the other 
at Cftmp i-ewis, as the sucuaer ĉ iiiip on big 
•̂ 1 ' " 
li£wed. \ 
Intreaisea gr̂ tiectlon was r;iyerî îo tha Qarroii-Heiena road 
later in th« year for in July, several recruits iii»ere ktllfed 
near Camp >.!Bwi.f uy the Indians, Coionei Gitiaoiia coaraanded 
severai. ficoutirig expeditlo«a sent ciut to apprehê  tli© Indiaiis 
who had conmitted the crl««> Giuoons marched Witlr hi men to 
^ " -'t-i ' : • : " i 
Caiap i-ewis and ssent patrole out into the surrounding country, 
29 while other patrols ŵ re sent uoth up ind down the road̂  
In the same year, lf?75i Captain i.udj.owi wIjo was sent 
out to survey the region from Carroll to Fort ̂ llis, reported 
the protection of the road during tht) &am̂ r ae foliows:̂ 9 
At Camp iî akor, fifty-two miles east of Uei.#na, is a 
permanent /;arri4»on of two companies of infant̂ ; at the 
forks of thfc Musî eAShexi, fifty-six mileo faî her eas%̂  
is a suiKaor eaî p of tuto companies of infantry aitd one )>f 
cavalry; at the Judith gcp, thirty mixes farther, is a 
detachment of eliphteen or twenty «en; acMi at CaiBp ̂ wis, 
thirty mixes farther and seventy-five miles out of CarrolXj 
is another suaioMir g<irri&on of two caaipaniejt of infantry, 
froa Viiiich a small detachraent guards tha staî e''station 
at Box Exder, forty saiies out of Caz*roll. 
i>urii\pr the next tŝ  years there were no reports of pat­
rols oeing maintained along the road for during this period 
2B, ijrigadier General Terry, ''Report of|'* Annual Eeoort of 
mL Mill xv̂ y5-?4,; p. o2... 
29. luid.. p. 
30. Captain ftililijBtt ibudlow, of a recunnaissatiice frotti 
Carroll, Montana Terrltoiy on the Upper Missouri to the 
Xellowstone national park ajad Return," (Washinfiton, 
i876r, p> :i3. 
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ail of the avaiiauAe soldiurs in Montana were engaged in an­
other attempt to finaxiy and forever settie the Indian prooieia. 
In protection was again furnished tbc Carroii--
Heiena road. Four companies of infaniry were gathered from 
the various poste in >iontana and sent out to a summer camp 
. . 31 
at Carroix. 
iiuring this time agitation had uoen growing for the ex-
t,erttion of the iine of permaitent miiitary posts farther to 
the east of ̂ ort Juogan to protect the p:rowing popuiatioa l>f 
central Montana. Aithoufjh the Indian wars of l&y6 and 1877 
had destroyed the concentrated power of the main liKlian tri£»e«, 
roving uands of Indians in f;reater number© continued to annoy 
the settlers. 
Cenerai Terry had planned since 1̂ 75 to discontinue Fort 
i.ogan and estaolish another post farther to the east) t>ut had 
oeen deterred oy the T̂ opie of the area. As the frontier 
settxeaaent raoved on and the agitation of a ne« frontier—the 
Judith iiasin—grew in strength, Fort i-ô an was abandoned. 
Instead of placing the next fort at the forks of the Musaei-
sheii as had ueen advocated, the next and last fort to be 
estauxishod to protect Centrax »ior.t&na was ioc&ted farther to 
the weet. It was near the foot of the Judith liountains and 
3i. Brigadier General Terry, "Report of," Annual Report of 
ilm Secretaiv 2£ iar» 1-̂ 79, p. 4̂ . 
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only a few idilete Caiap î ewis. Thie woye was brô ĥt auout 
iargeXy thrbU||h, the efforts of Major Martitt Magianiâ  the Mon­
tana delegate to 'Ĉ gress, after tn̂ oni t̂ be forti was nassed. 
t;h«.-location of thii jpoet, fort easy access 
.%0' gttartli«ag' t1h#';«i'adl|,h'' gap,/"to t̂ -es' .waa one 
of the gatewiiyB for the Indies aoirini: north 6r souths 
c«'ntl*̂ i,]̂ î $r-o:iiing>- dî tw of-
attô hei* rtcsat̂ ĥ south crossing pla,c« of- the Iiidtans, iaOout An 
ê uai diatanle# to on ̂ Ojc Eider Creek. ;Jt a was 
near ®ne of the ffialn crossing pimoes of the ̂ Ĵiaeouri in north-
î en̂ rai. Montftoia, Cow Island. 
On ACigust 22i 1580, Captain Pangerfield Parks and the 
aien and •qulpaenl frotti fort i.ogan estaulished Fort Maginnis. 
the post was located in the west pasture of Granville Stuart, 
one of the early settlers of the region. Work was delayed 
somewhat by the unexa«pled low water of the Mi8;.otiri which 
stojpped shipment of supplies up the river durinf, the neict 
spring and suomer. By the fall of 1̂ 1, there wre three 
storehouses, an issuing room, quartermaster and cof-imissary 
of the suosistarice officer, a hospital, three dcul&ie gets of 
Lieutenants' quarters, an administration ouildlnji, two douole 
oarracks, a gu?̂ rd house. Oakery, three staoles, fnd a root 
32 hoUse erected at the post. 
32. M̂ lnnis, Moiitan̂ ," j|eag& |ggaî > . 
176, First Session, 47th Congress, (Washington,isol), 
Vol. 22, p. 2; 
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when tfee final work of con8trutct>lon at Fort Ragiiiiils wa® 
finlshê d, th« buildings incxuded a cotoiBanding offic0r'9 
7 officers'quarters, 3 barrack#, a xiyi;*ary,' atJApex, i»fi*lce 
iouild̂ ngr h#(Se» stor® hottsGi shops, etepxô ees 
< i u a r i e % g i j ^ - a  » a w ' ' a i i # i ,  
haî eds house, 8tai;>i.os, and an ice houye*̂  ̂
„teiĵ vt̂ e :<ionf̂ î ct'ioii of a-new post, »ore, ̂̂ o4d:»-had'to---
be constructed t;C'''briog- -the post into- clô r - conts#l;\.vi'|;th l̂ e,. 
posts of the ssÂ '̂ pŝ ing, territory. Rocky Point, llii'tyt mi 
to the north, wss the closeist landing on the inissourl River, 
aUd soldiers i#er«̂  put to work isBmedlatexy, 
road to that po%ax.» Rocky Point uecarae one of the suiî r 
cam̂ s for Fort Maî innis, for troops were staulonsd there as 
xong as the Missouri i-'iver was open to steatasbips*̂  ̂
Anotber road mapped out to connect the fort with »,he 
Yellowstone River, to the south, and staites ran over their 
route tlifeee tî es weekly between Maginnis and Custê  ̂station 
Still c»ther roads were constructed Mid by l8S2, conî tions 
had been made with White Suipher Spriags, Martinsdale, and 
*<k}lden. 
33«, Quarteraaster General, '•Report of," 
MSESStiEI M M£. p. 449. 
34. Oenet̂  Terry, 'Report of,* Anauax Report of the Se«i!»t«ry 
of War, Mm Ko. I, Second 
Session, 47th Cohgreso, Pa#t 2, Vol. I, p. 37. 
35» luid.> p. 95. 
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Foin« was a fairly good sized post with a mixed 
ISarf̂ son of both cavalry and iRfantry. th<sre were generally 
apout 250 soldiers st̂ ttioned there. In 1302, there were thrse 
eompanies of the 2nd Cavalry, md two companies df the l̂ th 
iafantral consisting of 242 enlisted «eh, I? of|!lcers, aait 
7 scoutsî  fStis nuaber varied very xittle until after iS37 
whea the oiufiber was decreased. 
The post had already outlived its' usefttlnsee oy that 
tiiBe, for thci need for protection in the Judith Basin aî   ̂
central {«ontaj3ta had largely disappeared by 1335* The arsy 
had aarched to destroy the concentrated forces of the Sioux 
in 1376* In the campaign î vioh ensued, the Sioux were crushed 
except for a aamd under Sitting dull that escaped into Canada* 
In this campaign the well known story of *Custer*a Last Stand* 
ô curr̂ i, uut this was only a saall part of the caapaign vAilch 
destroyed the power of the Sioux* The threat of Sitting iiull 
and his group reiaained over northsra Montana until IB̂ l, when 
the last ramnant of the group surrendered to the arsy* 
Anothsr group of tndians from the west caused exciteGsent 
in Montafta in the following year. Chief Joseph and his Hez 
Peî e; trioe iiSov<»d through Montana in 1377 whlxc trying to 
elude tĥ - araed lorcei. hl«. In hi r flight Chief 
Joseph led his hand through central î ontana on the way to 
36. .idlrlgadier Gen̂ iil'Tsî ryj •'Reĵ rt of? Annual /•aaart of t̂ e 
m p' 7̂* 
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CanadAt defeated and captosr̂ d aoon &it&t crpssihg the 
Mlasô jri Hiver near Cow Island, py QqX̂ q&I Milm, this renoved 
another source of Xndian trou&le In the HorthiM̂ t* 
Another triue, the Bannock lodiafts, caused father unrest 
In Montana in lM7$, when they ô 'ired into Montana im search of 
Frora their r6serv«iti0ii in Idaho they "l̂ owid in|o 
weat̂ rii- jib̂ ana an4 foiiov#̂  "t̂ e of of"'the 
-V- • •.•..<• ... . - _ /. . 1- ,/ 
year before. They did not reâ h eeetral Montana iii%eii t̂ ey 
noved noft̂ h out of lellovrstone Park however, for l̂ lonel Miles 
laet̂ theiai'and for<:ed then to surrender in southern Montana. 
There were satall outoreal# among the Indians of Montana 
after this period of Indian wars but the troops in Montana 
had i&creaeed to such an extent that they were easily aule to 
handle the situation, îth the smrrender of Sitting dull i« 
1̂ 01, the aituation in Montana aasuAed a peaceful states* 
Ifuiiaito were placed on snail resenrationfi and were wê l î ard* 
ed there' ̂  troops* The eff̂ fts of th«j soldiers in the forts 
beeaBM» a routine affairt of patrol duty and drilx. At î ort 
Ma|;inQl8, it was reported that the troops did iittle aiore than v 
JU 
shoot 40 shots a day at tin Indians on the parade groasd. 
The ranehers endured the inefficiency of the army at Fort 
Maginnis as long as they couxd̂  then took matters inta their 
xOx 
haii4d. Any Indian e»ught stealing horses or kixiing 
cattle were treated the same as isy white thlff to west­
ern Jttetiee. 
4fter iH5V» the troops at Fort Maginnis were reduced In 
num&er and i3B9 there waft jCMAiy Qiie troop of oavalry at the 
poet. This trooj:; was reaoved in 4090, and the amy ,, 
left, thoif''setceatî ^̂ l̂ atâ a tfO ̂ fend̂  f̂ r tNineeliree* 
Thê ;ptfee'iî ^̂  ̂ lJ«d. eaf'iried .'̂ ê i'rerî tdr̂ l̂iito'ceiitî ~̂  
Mohtana were al̂ ndoned â out the eaae time* Fort iSiiis had 
been vacated in aa t̂ he frbntiir iior̂ * the other 
B̂ ih fort in the line. Port Shaw remained in operation until 
1$9̂ 4 when it too was 8ti>andoned. ) 
Thus the protection of the eettleraents, the epareely 
settled areae, and the routea of travel in and into Montana 
by ̂ e army ended. The anay had aecoapXÎ hed ita goal, for 
fXî rishiilig aettleffients had sprung up throughout the area. 
RanehiniS and faraiing of a more permanent nature had replaced 
the tmporary oining pepulation. The Indians no longer roas-
ed fis thef pleased but were restricted to reservations and 
forced to stay there# 
fhe poxicy the anay followed was to a fjreat extent the 
pXao laid down uy the people of the west. Hot axways did the 
army do ti^at it had planned on doing, and which aight have 
»Min pore appropriate in the long run, for the influence of 
the people it protected was strong enough to dictate terms. 
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Even then the people were not always gr&tefui for the protect 
tion they received. It wae not Viflth regret t? t the people 
of the Judith b&Bin watched the final exodu© of troops from 
central Montana. 
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iio. 23. oucond Seaeio-, 39th Uonpress, Washington, 
xdo5, vox. o. 
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